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  331 
DELAY AND ITS BENEFITS FOR JUDICIAL 
RULEMAKING UNDER SCIENTIFIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
REBECCA HAW* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court’s increasing use of science and social science in 
its decision making has a rationalizing effect on law that helps ensure that a rule 
will have its desired effect. But resting doctrine on the shifting sands of scientific 
and social scientific opinion endangers legal stability. The Court must be respon-
sive, but not reactive, to new scientific findings and theories, a difficult balance 
for lay justices to strike. This Article argues that the Court uses delay—defined as 
refusing to make or change a rule in light of new scientific arguments at time 
one, and then making or changing the rule because of the same arguments at time 
two—as a tool to improve decision making amidst scientific uncertainty. Using 
the Court’s antitrust jurisprudence as an example, this Article shows that delay 
can have a salutary effect on rulemaking because it allows the Court to use aca-
demic consensus (that either develops or matures between times one and two) as 
a signal of scientific reliability. As a conservatizing device, delay operates in the 
common law tradition, but it also avoids some of the failures associated with tra-
ditional common law features like stare decisis and incrementalism. The Article 
concludes by contrasting Supreme Court decision making with an area of law 
where delay is impractical or undesirable. In toxic tort litigation, where the goals 
of deterrence and compensation preclude the use of delay in the face of new sci-
entific arguments, the law pays the price in uncertainty and error. 
INTRODUCTION 
Watchers of antitrust law are often confounded by the slowness with 
which the Supreme Court adjusts doctrine to conform to new economic sci-
ence.1 Why did it take decades for a compelling microeconomic theory to take 
down the ancient per se rule against resale price maintenance (“RPM”)?2 Why 
did the Court drag its feet in changing an economically incoherent presumption 
                                                                                                                                       
© 2014, Rebecca Haw. All rights reserved. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; M. Phil, Uni-
versity of Cambridge; B.A., Yale University. I would like to thank Ed Cheng, Daniel Epps, John Mo-
nahan, Suzanna Sherry, Jim Rossi, and Kate Webber for helpful comments on previous drafts. 
1 See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, Albrecht Overruled—At Last, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 
537, 566 (1998); Alan Delvin, On the Ramifications of Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc.: Are Tie-Ins Next?, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 387, 387–88 (2008); Joshua D. Wright, Moving 
Beyond Naïve Foreclosure Analysis, 19 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2012). 
2 See infra notes 23–87 and accompanying text. 
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of market power?3 And why is the Court still denying certiorari petitions that 
raise new and important antitrust concerns about a common business practice?4 
The answer, in part, lies in the problems inherent in resting doctrine on the 
shifting sands of scientific opinion. 
This Article explores the phenomenon of Supreme Court delay in the con-
text of antitrust jurisprudence, with the expectation that the lessons learned 
there will have broader implications. Uncertainty is frequently offered as a rea-
son for Supreme Court action.5 The classic occasion for granting certiorari is 
the circuit split, in which disagreement among lower courts forces the Court to 
step in to resolve the dispute with a single, authoritative rule and saves parties 
and courts from continuing to suffer under doubt and ambiguity about what the 
law is.6 But one kind of uncertainty seems to be a reason for Supreme Court 
inaction. Where scientific facts necessary to the formulation of an optimal rule 
are uncertain, the Court delays making or changing a rule until academic de-
bate has settled on a consensus, one that is observable and robust enough for 
the Court to accept as truth.7 
A new scientific theory presents a temptation and a risk to lay justices that 
want to design effective antitrust regulation. On the one hand, new scientific 
knowledge tempts the Court with the promise of scientific currency, a form of 
insurance against rule obsolescence and inefficiency. But the rapid pace of sci-
entific change makes legal adoption of the latest economic fad risky. Today’s 
popular new theory can be tomorrow’s dead letter. A legal regime too reactive 
to change in economic opinion will flip-flop between antitrust rules with each 
new volley in the debate, which spells trouble for rule of law principles like 
stability and predictability. 
Alternatively, delay allows the Court to take a compromise position on new 
economics that harnesses the informational benefits of dynamic scientific 
thought and preserves rule stability and long-term accuracy. Delay puts a thumb 
on the scale of the status quo, which has its own informational and stabilizing 
benefits. And by putting off a decision, it also enriches the information available 
to the Court when next it reconsiders the antitrust rule. As indicia of economic 
consensus develop, so does the Court’s confidence in making a major change to 
doctrine. Delay allows the Court to alter the legal landscape—sometimes dra-
matically—while minimizing the risk of error and unpredictability. 
                                                                                                                                       
3 See infra notes 102–113 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 114–123 and accompanying text. 
5 See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 246–52 (1991). 
6 See id. (explaining that circuit splits make issues “certworthy”). 
7 See infra notes 23–123 and accompanying text. 
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Part I of this Article uses the Court’s RPM jurisprudence—from 1911’s 
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.8 to 2007’s Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.9—as a blueprint for its practice of delay.10 
It reviews the intellectual history of the economic ideas behind Leegin,11 and 
observes that the Court passed up several earlier opportunities to use them in 
Dr. Miles.12 This Part argues that although a full causal account of why the 
Court took so long to overrule Dr. Miles would include other factors, the in-
formational benefits of delay should be accounted for in any criticism of the 
Court’s inertia.13 This Part then identifies other areas of antitrust law where the 
Court delayed conforming antitrust doctrine to developing economic thought, 
suggesting that its RPM jurisprudence is not anomalous.14 
Part II then makes the theoretical case for delay as an information-
enhancing mechanism.15 Delay improves the scientific information available to 
the Court by allowing time for a scientific consensus to emerge, by providing 
information about the stability of an existing consensus, or by providing evi-
dence of consensus where it is difficult for the Court to detect.16 Part II then 
argues that delay, as a conservatizing force, operates in the spirit of the com-
mon law, even where it ultimately results in the kind of large-scale change that 
the case-by-case method typically scorns.17 
Part III proves the value of delay in the negative.18 It shows that in a dif-
ferent judicial context—trial-level causation questions in toxic tort cases—
delay is impossible or at least undesirable because judicial values other than 
long-term rule accuracy and legal stability are particularly important.19 In toxic 
tort suits, fairness to the injured and deterrence of corporate irresponsibility 
dictate a short interval between new science and legal consequence.20 The 
price that tort law pays in inaccuracy suggests that in contexts where delay is 
not precluded by other considerations, delay can have significant benefits by 
avoiding these costs.21 Part III then concludes by contrasting the values at 
                                                                                                                                       
8 See generally 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (holding resale price maintenance (“RPM”) to be a violation 
of antitrust law), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 
(2007). 
9 See generally 551 U.S. 877 (overruling Dr. Miles’s ban on minimum RPM). 
10 See infra notes 23–123 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 88–123 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 124–222 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 154–178 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 179–222 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 223–304 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 226–260 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 295–300 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 295–300 and accompanying text. 
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stake in Supreme Court antitrust law and toxic tort litigation to explain the dif-
ferent tradeoff values in each context.22 
I. DELAY IN ANTITRUST 
The Supreme Court delays making or changing antitrust rules—
sometimes for decades—in response to changed economic thinking.23 The pro-
cess of delay follows a simple pattern: at time one, certiorari petitioners pre-
sent economic arguments for changing or making an antitrust rule, which the 
Court declines to do either by deciding the case narrowly or denying the peti-
tion altogether.24 At time two, petitioners present the same argument with 
largely the same economic evidence, but this time the Court makes or changes 
the rule.25 This Part considers the Court’s RPM doctrine as an example of this 
pattern. First, Section A describes the Supreme Court’s path from Dr. Miles to 
its reversal Leegin.26 Then, Section B explains that the economic theory sup-
porting Leegin had been known for decades.27 Next, Section C discusses the 
Court’s foregone opportunities to reverse Dr. Miles before Leegin.28 Finally, 
Section D identifies other areas of its antitrust jurisprudence featuring a similar 
lag.29 
A. From Dr. Miles to Leegin 
The Supreme Court’s rules against RPM originated with its now-
infamous Dr. Miles decision.30 Minimum RPM is the practice of selling a 
product to a distributor or retailer on the condition that the distributor or retail-
er resell the product above a particular price.31 Dr. Miles involved a manufac-
turer that sought to enforce a contract term that restricted retail pricing against 
                                                                                                                                       
22 See infra notes 301–304 and accompanying text. 
23 See Blair & Lopatka, supra note 1, at 566 (describing the Supreme Court’s delay in changing 
the law on vertical maximum price fixing); Delvin, supra note 1, at 387–88 (describing the Supreme 
Court’s delay in changing law on RPM); Wright, supra note 1, at 1165 (describing the “mismatch 
between new economic theories and obsolete doctrine” as an “uncomfortable tension”). 
24 See, e.g., infra notes 65–84 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s refusals to overturn 
Dr. Miles despite contradictory economic evidence beginning in 1977). 
25 See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882; see also infra notes 40–50 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the Supreme Court’s reversal of Dr. Miles in light of decades of economic research). 
26 See infra notes 30–50 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 65–87 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 88–123 and accompanying text. 
30 220 U.S. at 409. 
31 See, e.g., B.S. YAMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 3 (1954) (“A manu-
facturer who practises resale price maintenance requires his distributors (wholesalers and/or retailers) 
to resell the price-constrained goods at stipulated fixed prices or at not less than stipulated minimum 
prices.”). 
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a discounting distributor.32 The distributor argued that the vertical price re-
straint imposed by Dr. Miles was a “restraint of trade” in violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.33 The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the rule against vertical 
price restraints vindicated “[t]he right of alienation.”34Although the Court did 
not use the phrase “per se,” the case was quickly interpreted to establish a hard 
line against vertical price minimums.35 
Although the holding in Dr. Miles was not based on economic reasoning, 
the dissent criticized it for hindering certain procompetitive practices.36 A 
prescient Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. argued in dissent that manufactur-
ers should be free to punish “knaves [who] cut reasonable prices for some ulte-
rior purpose of their own.”37 Nearly fifty years later, economists would identi-
fy the precise harm of that knavery38 and ignite the policy debate that raged—
for almost another fifty years—over the appropriateness of a per se rule against 
minimum RPM.39 
The Court finally overturned Dr. Miles in its 2007 Leegin decision, in 
which the Court held that although anticompetitive uses of minimum RPM 
were possible, its efficient uses were neither “infrequent [n]or hypothetical.”40 
Per se condemnation, therefore, was not justified.41 The Court reasoned that to 
condemn per se a business practice with pro and anticompetitive uses was to 
sacrifice all its benefits to avoid its risks.42 Instead, it would be better—as the 
Court explained—to allow courts to evaluate each use on the case-by-case ba-
sis that the rule of reason affords.43 Thus, the viability of the procompetitive 
theories of minimum RPM was essential to the Court’s argument. 
                                                                                                                                       
32 220 U.S. at 375–81. Dr. Miles—a manufacturer of elixirs—required its distributors to agree to 
a resale price no less than a specified minimum. Id. at 374. When a distributor began interfering with 
this contractual scheme, Dr. Miles sued it, alleging that the distributor had induced others to breach 
their contracts with Dr. Miles. Id. at 374–75. 
33 Id. at 390, 392; see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, 
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
34 See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404. 
35 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 
(1984)) (“The Court has interpreted [Dr. Miles] as establishing a per se rule against a vertical agree-
ment between a manufacturer and its distributor to set minimum resale prices.”). 
36 220 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. 
38 See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 91 
(1960) (hypothesizing that price maintenance prevents retailers from free riding on point of sale ser-
vices by other retailers); infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text (discussing how price maintenance 
prevents retailers from free riding on point-of-sale services by other retailers). 
39 See infra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
40 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 895. 
43 Id. at 898–99. 
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The fact that none of the procompetitive justifications for RPM were new 
at the time of Leegin prompted criticisms of the Court’s new rule.44 Economic 
arguments substantially identical to the ones invoked by the Court’s majority 
opinion appeared in economic and legal literature as early as 1954,45 and by 
1980, they had been restated and refined by over a dozen economists and legal 
academics.46 To dissenting Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by three other justic-
es, only significantly changed circumstances should override the Court’s ad-
herence to stare decisis.47 Although new economic evidence could provide 
such a change in circumstances, that was not the case with RPM, as the per se 
rule against RPM had already survived the development and popularity of pro-
competitive justifications for the practice.48 The rule’s continued applicability 
suggested that it was defensible for reasons other than the absence of procom-
petitive uses of RPM.49 Finding those reasons persuasive, the dissenters ex-
plained that they would have upheld the per se rule.50 
B. The History of Leegin’s Procompetitive Theory of Minimum RPM 
Justice Breyer was right: substantially all of the arguments against Dr. 
Miles’s per se rule were well-known for decades.51 Leegin’s most prominent 
economic justification for minimum RPM—that it prevents free riding among 
retailers and distributors—was articulated in 1960 by Lester Telser.52 Telser 
developed a model of retailing in which manufacturers use RPM to increase 
                                                                                                                                       
44 See id. at 918–23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
45 See YAMEY, supra note 31, at 52. 
46 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 290–91 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 67–68 (1976); Donald I. Baker, Vertical Restraints in 
Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 541 (1975); Ward S. 
Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 
840–43 (1955); William S. Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor 
and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1427–35 (1968); J.R. Gould & L.E. Preston, Resale Price 
Maintenance and Retail Outlets, 32 ECONOMICA 302, 311–12 (1965); Martin B. Louis, Vertical Dis-
tributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a Partial 
Per Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275, 296–306 (1976); Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust 
Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 279–80 (1975); Telser, supra note 38, at 91; Oliver E. 
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost 
Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 955–58 (1979); Edwin M. Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions 
After Sealy and Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181, 1182–87 (1967); Allen B. Chronister & Jerry 
R. Goldstein, Note, Territorial and Customer Restrictions: A Trend Toward a Broader Rule of Rea-
son?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 146 (1971); Elizabeth Hellman, Note, Vertical Territorial and 
Customer Restrictions in the Franchising Industry, 10 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 497, 515–16 
(1974). 
47 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 918–23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
48 See id. at 920. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. at 929. 
51 See Telser, supra note 38, at 91. 
52 Id. 
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demand for its products, solving the “long-standing puzzle” of why manufac-
turers would wish to keep resale prices high.53 
Telser advanced a theory, one eventually endorsed by Leegin, that manu-
facturers give their retailers a profit margin to induce them to provide “special 
services” at the point of sale.54 Inducement is necessary, explained Telser, be-
cause if retailers are free to discount, they will “free ride” on higher-price, 
higher-service retailers by offering the product without the services for a 
cheaper price.55 This free riding will eventually unravel the market for point-
of-sale services altogether, because the high-service sellers, knowing they can-
not beat their discounting rivals, must join them in offering low prices without 
services.56 Telser explained that the bargain bin is not always the optimal sales 
outlet, because for some products, special services boost demand enough to 
compensate for the higher price that covers the cost of providing those ser-
vices.57 For these products, manufacturers can use minimum RPM to prevent 
the market for point-of-sale services from unraveling.58 
As Telser’s model gained traction within the economic and legal acade-
mies, pressure against the Dr. Miles rule began to build.59 When the Court de-
cided United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. in 1967, which expanded Dr. 
Miles’s per se rule to vertical territorial (non-price) restrictions,60 it provoked 
an onslaught of criticism from the economists who had developed models 
demonstrating the procompetitive potential of similar restraints in the last dec-
                                                                                                                                       
53 Id. at 86. All things being equal, however, higher retail prices should mean reduced demand for 
manufacturers’ products. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 171 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that, “one 
might expect the manufacturer always to encourage rather than restrict competition among his deal-
ers”); see also YAMEY, supra note 31, at 3 (“On the face of it price competition among distributors 
would seem to serve the interests of manufacturers.”). 
54 Telser, supra note 38, at 86. In-store, pre-sale product demonstration could be such a demand-
enhancing special service. Id. at 91. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. Telser’s account was the earliest articulation of the free-riding theory that is substantially 
identical to the one endorsed by the Court in Leegin, but his ideas have even older origins in the eco-
nomics literature. See YAMEY, supra note 31, at 52–56; Bowman, supra note 46, at 840–43. Telser’s 
1960 article was a response to the work on RPM in the previous decade that recognized that the provi-
sion of point-of-sale services might have something to do with manufacturers’ use of RPM. See 
Telser, supra note 38, at 86 n.1, 89 n.4 (responding to YAMEY, supra note 31, at 52–56; Bowman, 
supra note 46, at 840–43). Telser traces the “special services” story back even farther, quoting a pas-
sage from a 1932 book observing that “‘where the sale depends on demonstration or service on the 
part of the distributor . . . the injury [of price cutting] to the manufacturer is probable.’” Id. at 89 n.4 
(quoting EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN & ROBERT A. LOVE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 
193 (1932)). 
59 See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 398 (1966) (suggesting that the economic theories that guided Dr. Miles 
did not “have any merit”); infra note 61 (collecting sources). 
60 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967). For example, in Schwinn, manufacturers allocated exclusive territo-
ries to wholesalers and limited sales of products to franchisees. Id. at 367. 
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ade.61 Since the mid-1960s, it was clear that Telser’s model applied to non-
price restraints because any mechanism that suppresses intrabrand competition 
can solve the free-riding problem and induce retailer point-of-sale services.62 
The Court’s economically questionable decision in Schwinn spurred a 
flurry of productivity in the economic and law-and-economic academies that 
produced essentially all of the arguments that would ever be presented to the 
Court in support of overturning Dr. Miles.63 In particular, in 1983, a 200-page 
report on RPM for the Federal Trade Commission detailed the economic evi-
dence, theoretical and empirical, for and against allowing RPM as a legal mat-
ter.64 Very little changed in economic scholarship on RPM in the years between 
the report and Leegin. 
C. The Court’s Forgone Opportunities to Overturn Dr. Miles 
Between Telser’s 1960 article and the 2007 Leegin decision, the Court de-
clined at least three opportunities to change the per se rule against minimum 
RPM.65 Strikingly, in each of these cases, amicus briefs presented the Court 
with substantially similar economic theories to those that it eventually relied 
on to justify the holding in Leegin.66 
The Court’s first opportunity to revisit Dr. Miles was in 1977, when the 
Court overruled Schwinn with its decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania Inc.67 In sparing vertical territorial restrictions from per se treatment un-
der Dr. Miles, Sylvania implicitly adopted Telser’s model of improved inter-
brand competition through restricted intrabrand competition.68 The opinion 
cited more than a dozen economics and law-and-economics articles that sang 
                                                                                                                                       
61 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 46, at 537; Milton Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Re-
view—1967, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667, 1680–81 (1967); Richard W. McLaren, Territorial and Customer 
Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Retail Prices and Refusals to Deal, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 137, 
143–44 (1968); Earl E. Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 NW. U. L. REV. 
595, 602–03 (1968); Robinson, supra note 46, at 271; Note, Territorial Restrictions and Per Se 
Rules—A Reevaluation of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. REV. 616, 617 (1972). Ironi-
cally, one of the most forceful critics of Schwinn was Richard Posner, who argued and won the case 
for the government. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of 
the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 282, 296 (1975) (critiquing Schwinn). 
62 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 46, at 537; Handler, supra note 61, at 1680–81; McLaren, supra 
note 61, at 143–44; Pollock, supra note 61, at 602–03. 
63 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 46, at 537; Handler, supra note 61, at 1680–81; McLaren, supra 
note 61, at 143–44; Pollock, supra note 61, at 602–03. 
64 See generally THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, FED. TRADE COMM’N, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: 
ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (1983) (detailing arguments for and against retail 
price maintenance). 
65 See infra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 67–84 and accompanying text. 
67 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977). 
68 Id. at 51–57. 
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the praises of vertical distributional restrictions generally.69 Yet the Court used 
these arguments to act narrowly: it carefully carved out territorial restraints 
from the Dr. Miles rule, but left resale price restrictions per se unlawful.70 A 
broader holding—that all vertical restrictions (price and non-price) should be 
analyzed under the rule of reason—was certainly possible.71 In fact, Justice 
Byron White suggested in his concurrence that the majority’s reasoning re-
quired that result.72 
The Court’s next two opportunities to overturn Dr. Miles are even more 
remarkable than Sylvania because, unlike in that case, the issue of undoing the 
per se status of minimum RPM was squarely before the Court.73 First, in 1984, 
the Court decided Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., which it framed 
as a case about the evidentiary sufficiency to support a violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act for price-fixing.74 It held that evidence that a manufacturer ter-
minated a price-cutting distributor after receiving complaints from rival dis-
tributors was, by itself, not sufficient to establish § 1 liability.75 Although the 
Court chose a narrow ground to decide Monsanto, it was asked to do more.76 
The government’s amicus brief argued a “more fundamental” ground for rever-
sal than the evidentiary question: “There is no sound basis for assuming, as 
courts have since Dr. Miles . . . that resale price maintenance is so invariably 
anticompetitive as to justify per se condemnation.”77 The brief relied heavily 
on Telser’s 1960 article, as well as subsequent scholarship by Robert Bork and 
Richard Posner.78 Justice William Brennan wrote separately to emphatically 
reject the government’s invitation to overrule the per se rule, noting that alt-
hough “[t]he Solicitor General . . . and several other amici suggest that we take 
                                                                                                                                       
69 Id. at 48 n.13, 56. 
70 Id. at 51 n.18 (“The per se illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for many 
years and involves significantly different questions of analysis and policy.”). But even at that time, 
most economists believed that price and non-price restrictions had similar effects. See supra note 61 
(collecting sources). 
71 See Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the 
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (observing that the “Court must have realized . . . that the 
[free rider] concept applies with equal force to resale price maintenance”). 
72 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69–70 (White, J., concurring). 
73 See infra notes 74–84 and accompanying text. 
74 465 U.S. at 755 (“This case presents a question as to the standard of proof required to find a 
vertical price-fixing conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”); see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
75 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (explaining that “something more than evidence of complaints is 
needed,” but ultimately finding that the verdict against Monsanto should stand because it was indeed 
supported by “something more”). 
76 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Monsanto, 465 
U.S. 752 (No. 82-914), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 375, at *13. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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this opportunity to reconsider [Dr. Miles],” the Court would “decline to reach 
the question.”79 
This pattern repeated itself four years later in Business Electronics Corp. 
v. Sharp Electronics Corp.80 Again, the Court was asked to reverse Dr. Miles,81 
and again it decided the case only on the narrow issue of what constitutes an 
agreement under § 1.82 This time, however, it was not the Justice Department 
calling for Dr. Miles’s demise; the defendant-manufacturer cross-petitioned the 
Court to grant certiorari on the issue.83 The Court did not even mention the 
request in its opinion.84 
Many factors may account for the Court’s change of heart between 1988 
and 2007. Indeed, too many things changed to allow a simple causal story to 
be told about why the Court, when presented with the same question and the 
same economic evidence, came up with a different answer. Congress’s disap-
proval of RPM softened.85 Cases were decided that lessened the practical ef-
fect of the Dr. Miles rule.86 Perhaps most importantly, the composition of the 
Court shifted right; the average justice in 2007 was more business-friendly and 
                                                                                                                                       
79 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 769 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
80 485 U.S. 717, 735–36 (1988). 
81 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14–15, Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 
(Nos. 85-1910 & 85-2094) (“The question presented in the cross petition (No. 85-2094) is whether the 
Court should reconsider its decisions holding that resale price maintenance is per se unlawful.”). 
82 Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 735–36; see 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
83 See Brief for Respondent Sharp Electronics Corp. at 15, Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (No. 
85-1910), 1987 WL 881326, at *15; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at 14–15. The 
government’s silence was hardly surprising. As it explained in its amicus brief in the case, “The stat-
ute appropriating funds for the operation of the Department of Justice during the current fiscal year 
states in pertinent part that ‘none of the funds appropriated in this Act may be used for any activity to 
alter the per se prohibition on resale price maintenance.’” Brief for United States, supra note 81, at 15 
(quoting Joint Resolution of Oct. 30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 605, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-73). The 
Department’s hands were tied by Congress, who evidently did not approve of its brief in Monsanto. 
See id. 
84 See generally Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (declining to mention the petition to reconsider 
the Dr. Miles rule). In addition to these most prominent refusals to revisit Dr. Miles, the Court also 
denied several certiorari petitions between 1977 and 2007 that called for an end to the per se ban on 
RPM. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, World of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 
1467 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1985). The Court also implicitly reaffirmed the Dr. 
Miles rule in 1987 in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy. See 479 U.S. 335, 341 (1987) (“Resale price mainte-
nance has been a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act since the early years of national antitrust 
enforcement.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
85 See Richard M. Brunell, Overruling Dr. Miles: The Supreme Trade Commission in Action, 52 
ANTITRUST BULL. 475, 479 & n.21 (2007). Congress stopped conditioning Justice Department fund-
ing on its RPM stance in the early 1990s and failed to pass legislation codifying Dr. Miles in 1991. 
See id. 
86 See id. at 480. In one commentator’s words, Dr. Miles had been “largely defanged” by cases 
like Monsanto and Business Electronics. Id. (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act 
and Competition: Unfinished Business, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 125, 125 (2000)). 
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hostile to antitrust liability than in 1988.87 But in the interim, the economic 
consensus about RPM economics matured, so that when the Court did eventu-
ally change the rule by relying on procompetitive arguments about RPM, those 
arguments had been in the mainstream for decades. 
D. Other Examples of Supreme Court Delay in Antitrust Jurisprudence 
1. Maximum RPM 
Alongside the Court’s line of minimum RPM cases ran a related line of 
cases addressing the legality of maximum RPM.88 Maximum RPM has an even 
less obvious anticompetitive effect because its purpose and effect appeared to 
keep retail prices lower rather than higher, as with minimum RPM.89 But the 
Court included maximum RPM in the per se category in 1968 with its decision 
in Albrecht v. Herald Co.90 
The Court began to exhibit doubts about the illegality of maximum RPM 
in its 1989 case Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. (ARCO).91 An 
economic consensus had emerged in the 1980s that maximum RPM was al-
most always efficient and beneficial to the consumer.92 Accordingly, when the 
Court granted certiorari in ARCO,93 the Newspaper Publishers Association 
filed an amicus brief asking the Court to abolish the Albrecht rule in light of 
the academic consensus.94 As the Court did in Monsanto and Sharp, it declined 
the invitation to revisit its previous economically incorrect decision.95 But it 
did question the continued wisdom of Albrecht, observing, as the Newspaper 
Publishers Association had, that “[m]any commentators have identified pro-
competitive effects of vertical, maximum price fixing.”96 As support for that 
                                                                                                                                       
87 See Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 871, 
872–73 (2011) (noting that many scholars view the Roberts Court as highly pro-business); cf. Delvin, 
supra note 1, at 388 (“The Roberts Court has appeared to some to have taken a shift to the right with 
the addition of its two new members.”). 
88 See infra notes 89–101 and accompanying text. 
89 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 888 (1981). 
90 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968). 
91 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co. (ARCO), 495 U.S. 328, 331 (1990). 
92 See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA & HEBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 340.30b (1988); Roger 
D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1554 n.118 
(1989); Easterbrook, supra note 89, at 888. 
93 ARCO, 495 U.S. at 331. 
94 Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief of the American Newspaper Publishers Ass’n as Ami-
cus Curiae at 7, ARCO, 495 U.S. 328 (No. 88-1668). This was not the first time the Court had been 
asked to do the same thing; in 1988 it denied a petition for certiorari from Miller Brewing Company 
that demanded a reversal of Albrecht. See Beer Wholesalers, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 426 N.W.2d 
438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1039 (1989). 
95 ARCO, 495 U.S. at 335 n.5 (“We assume, arguendo, that Albrecht correctly held that vertical, 
maximum price fixing is subject to the per se rule.”). 
96 Id. at 343 n.13. 
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statement, the Court reproduced a footnote and string cite from the Newspa-
pers’ brief.97 
Albrecht’s maximum RPM rule had its Leegin moment in 1997 when the 
Court decided State Oil Co. v. Khan.98 The Court reversed Albrecht in light of 
“a considerable body of scholarship” criticizing the theoretical justifications 
for Albrecht’s rule.99 But Khan, like Leegin, relied almost exclusively on 
scholarship written before the Court’s last clear chance to overrule the case.100 
In fact, the Court mostly relied on economic arguments it itself had explained 
in ARCO.101 
2. Market Power Conferred by Patent 
Perhaps the most infamous example of delayed rulemaking in the face of 
advances in economic science is that of the long-standing—and economically 
indefensible—presumption that a patent confers market power on its holder.102 
Such a presumption makes intuitive sense, because a patent holder, by defini-
tion, faces no competition from others making the identical product. That intui-
tion was perhaps enough to justify the Supreme Court’s decision to establish it 
as a rule in the tying context in 1947 in International Salt Co. v. United 
States.103 This was, however, before economists developed more sophisticated 
models of markets and market power.104 But by the 1970s, mainstream econo-
mists agreed that patents did not necessarily confer market power given that 
many patented products have adequate substitutes in the market.105 
In 1985, the Court passed up a chance to revisit this presumption when it 
denied certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s application of the presumption 
in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp.106 Justices Byron White and Harry 
                                                                                                                                       
97 Compare id. (citing six sources previously cited in the Brief for the Newspaper Assocation), 
with Brief for the Newspaper Association, supra note 94, at 7 n.12 (citing six of the sources later cited 
in ARCO). 
98 See 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (“We conclude that Albrecht should be overruled.”). 
99 Id. at 15. 
100 Id. at 15–18 (citing scholarship dating back to 1972). 
101 Id. at 14–15 (citing ARCO, 495 U.S. at 343 n.13). 
102 Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be the Tie?,” 4 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 57 (1991) (“The presumption of market power from ownership of a patent or copy-
right in antitrust tying violations has been extensively criticized on the basis of economic theory.”). 
Market power, or the ability to profitably raise price above the competitive equilibrium, is often an 
essential factual question in antitrust cases since many offenses require it as an element. See Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 8 (1984). Tying, for example, is per se unlawful if the 
defendant has market power in the tying product. See, e.g., id. at 13–14. 
103 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947).  
104 See Burchfiel, supra note 102, at 57 & n.340 (collecting criticisms of the patent presumption 
from prominent scholars such as Ward Bowman, Richard Posner, Robert Bork, Louis Kaplow, and 
Donald Turner). 
105 See id. 
106 734 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985). 
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Blackmun dissented from the denial, arguing that the Court should have taken 
this opportunity to revisit whether the existence of “legal monopol[ies]” such 
as copyrights creates market power.107 
At least one other member of the Court was also prepared to revisit Inter-
national Salt; just a year before in her concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor criticized the majority’s off-hand remark that patents 
grant market power to sellers.108 Justice O’Connor called the patent presump-
tion a “common misconception.”109 
That misconception would survive in Supreme Court jurisprudence, if 
nowhere else,110 until 2006 when the Court overruled International Salt in Illi-
nois Tool Works, Inc. v Independent Ink, Inc.111 As in Leegin, the Court refer-
enced scholarly opinion as a reason for the overruling,112 but only cited argu-
ments that had been well-known for decades.113 Even the more recent sources 
cited by the Court in Illinois Tool merely restated arguments that were preva-
lent in the economic literature since the 1970s, ones that were very much 
mainstream when the Court denied certiorari in Digidyne. 
3. Still Waiting for a Leegin Moment: Market-Share Discounts 
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in cases concerning a cur-
rent topic of scholarship in the law-and-economics academy: the competitive 
effects of market-share discounts (also called loyalty discounts).114 A market-
share discount is a special price, often achieved through rebates, offered to cus-
tomers who buy a given percentage of their requirements from a seller instead 
of from the seller’s competitors.115 Although the practice has been popular for 
                                                                                                                                       
107 Data General Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S. 908, 909 (1985) (White, J., dissenting). 
108 466 U.S. at 37 n.7 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 16 (majority opinion). 
109 Id. at 37 n.7 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
110 Emboldened by Justice O’Connor’s Jefferson Parish footnote, and armed with decades of 
economic scholarship critical of International Salt’s presumption, many lower courts ignored its hold-
ing and required further proof of market power than the mere existence of patent or copyright protec-
tion. See 10 PHILLIP AREEDA ET. AL, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1737b (1996) (observing in 1996 that “most 
current lower courts decline to infer power from the limited legal monopolies conferred by patents, 
copyrights, or trademarks”); see also William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption of Economic 
Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 
1145–46 (1985) (describing lower court cases rejecting the presumption of market power conferred by 
patents). 
111 See 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006). 
112 Id. at 43 n.4 (“Our imposition of this requirement [of proof of market power] accords with the 
vast majority of academic literature on the subject.”). 
113 See id. at 43–45 (citing sources dating as far back at 1988). 
114 See ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
2025 (2013); Smith Wholesale Co., Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 865–66 (6th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 818 (2007); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 
1039, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979 (2000). 
115 Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining for Loyalty, 92 TEX. L. REV. 253, 259 (2013). 
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a long time, and raises unique competitive concerns, the Supreme Court has 
yet to create a rule that specifically governs market-share discounts.116 Lower 
courts struggling to evaluate Sherman Act claims alleging these discounts as a 
vehicle for monopolization have, for the most part, applied the Supreme 
Court’s predatory pricing doctrine that holds lawful any above-cost discount-
ing.117 But the academy and industry want more clarification on the subject 
because market-share discounts present economic issues distinct from those 
related to predatory pricing.118 
Only relatively recently have economic and law-and-economic literature 
discussed what exactly those economic issues are, and whether antitrust policy 
should encourage or discourage the use of such discounts.119 We may yet be in 
the decade when economic opinion about market-share discounts reaches its 
maturity; but at the moment, positions on both sides of the debate are populat-
ed by distinguished scholars.120 
Since 2000, the Court has denied petitions for certiorari in three cases that 
raised the legality of market share discounts under the Sherman Act.121 Most 
recently, the Court declined to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit’s 2012 opinion in Eaton Corp. v. ZF Meritor LLC, which approved of a 
monopolization theory premised on market-share discounts.122 One amicus 
brief—signed by eighteen scholars in support of the petition—cited several 
articles that discussed the economics of market-share discounts, including a 
2013 article that provides a survey of the economic scholarship on the sub-
ject.123 Perhaps eventually the Court will grant certiorari to create a rule gov-
erning the practice, giving market-share discounts its Leegin moment. And if 
that happens, it is not hard to imagine that the nineteen articles cited in the 
2013 survey article will figure prominently as academic support for the new 
rule. 
                                                                                                                                       
116 Id. at 270. 
117 Brief for Eighteen Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7, ZF Meritor LLC, 
133 S. Ct. 2025 (No. 12-1045) [hereinafter Scholars’ Amicus Brief] (citing Southeast Mo. Hosp. v. 
C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 610–13 (8th Cir. 2011); NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 447–
48, 455 (6th Cir. 2007); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 
2001); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062–63; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 
(1st Cir. 1983)). 
118 See Crane, supra note 115, at 270–71. 
119 See id. at 255 n.14 (collecting nineteen articles and book chapters dedicated to economic anal-
yses of loyalty discounts). 
120 See id. at 254–55. 
121 ZF Meritor LLC, 696 F.3d at 343; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d at 864–65; Concord 
Boat, 207 F.3d at 1045. 
122 See ZF Meritor LLC, 696 F.3d at 343. 
123 Scholars’ Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 11 n.5 (citing Crane, supra note 115, at 255 n.14). 
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II. THE BENEFITS OF DELAY 
Commentators often criticize the Court’s passivity in the face of new eco-
nomic scholarship, as if the Court’s lag behind the academy is always a bad 
thing.124 The logic seems to be that if antitrust rules must make economic 
sense, and if the Court refuses to incorporate known economic principles into 
its rulemaking, then the Court’s performance as rule-giver is suboptimal.125 
But this syllogism overlooks a very troubling aspect of resting a legal regime 
on a social scientific foundation. Science changes. To criticize the Court for 
refusing to adjust a rule in the face of economic truth begs the question of 
when, exactly, an economic argument achieves the status of truth. That the Su-
preme Court and economists answer this question differently is neither surpris-
ing nor necessarily bad. 
Section A of this Part first discusses the difficult institutional position the 
Court occupies when it considers a new antitrust rule, as it acts as rulemaker in 
an area of law requiring technical and theoretical knowledge.126 Although the 
Court ideally would defer to economic consensus as a proxy for scientific 
truth, consensus does not always exist. And even where it does, it can be diffi-
cult for a lay justice to observe. Given these institutional limitations, Section B 
then argues that the Court’s delay at time one can actually lead to better anti-
trust rulemaking by providing the Court with better information at time two.127 
It may be that the Court recognizes these salutary effects of delay and acts 
deliberately when it drags its feet in changing law in response to scientific 
opinion. But even if it does not (and making a convincing causal argument is 
difficult given the many reasons why the Court may choose to wait before al-
tering any given rule) the benefits of delay should not be ignored when as-
sessing the Court’s performance as antitrust regulator. 
A. The Court’s Expertise-Deficit and Its Consequences for Antitrust 
The Sherman Act has been interpreted as a broad delegation of authori-
ty—from Congress to the Supreme Court—to regulate competition policy in 
the first instance.128 And because the Court interprets the Act to require eco-
                                                                                                                                       
124 See Blair & Lopatka, supra note 1, at 537 (lamenting the length of time it took the Court to 
overrule Albrecht); Delvin, supra note 1, at 387 (calling the Court’s refusal to overrule Dr. Miles 
“intransigent and pertinacious”); Wright, supra note 1, at 1165 (describing the “mismatch between 
new economic theories and obsolete doctrine” as an “uncomfortable tension”). 
125 See Delvin, supra note 1, at 387–88 (“[N]otwithstanding the bedrock principle that antitrust 
cases must make economic sense, the rule that vertically imposed minimum price-based restraints are 
illegal has remained in force for almost a hundred years.”). 
126 See infra notes 128–153 and accompanying text. 
127 See infra notes 154–222 and accompanying text. 
128 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Non-
delegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 410 (2008) (“[The Sherman Act] delegates virtually 
boundless discretion to the federal courts to craft substantive antitrust rules . . . .”). 
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nomic efficiency as the guiding principle of antitrust regulation,129 it must act 
as the final arbiter in social scientific debates that are necessarily beyond its 
expertise.130 
The Court’s institutional role with respect to antitrust is hardly unique to 
that area of law. The Court is in a similar position whenever it acts as the pri-
mary rulemaker in an area of law demanding scientific or social scientific in-
puts. The most obvious domain where Court has primary rulemaking capacity 
is in interpreting the Constitution, and rulemaking under several provisions of 
the Constitution—including the First,131 Eighth,132 and Fourteenth133 Amend-
ments—require scientific or social scientific knowledge. In these areas, as in 
antitrust, the Court suffers from a similar expertise deficit outlined here. And in 
these areas, delay may have a similar effect on rulemaking. Accordingly, this 
Section uses the antitrust story to develop observations with broader applica-
tions. 
                                                                                                                                       
129 See United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[L]ike all antitrust 
cases, this one must make economic sense.”); Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1159, 1212 (2008) (“Within the last few decades a broad consensus has emerged that consumer 
welfare and economic efficiency are the overriding, if not exclusive, goals.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 138 (1984) (stating that the 
Court views antitrust laws as a consumer-welfare prescription); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, 
Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 695 
(2005) (“Unlike areas of law that look to expertise to resolve occasional issues of fact, antitrust must 
incorporate economics into every substantive and evidentiary rule and standard . . . .”). In antitrust, 
economics is—to borrow John Monahan and Laurens Walker’s terminology— “social authority,” 
which they define as “social science research relevant to creating a rule of law.” John Monahan & 
Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (1986). 
130 See Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2011). 
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. For example, the Court’s “secondary effects” doctrine under the 
First Amendment allows local governments to regulate speech, typically adult entertainment, that has 
“secondary effects” on criminal activity. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 
U.S. 425, 430 (2002). In defining the contours of the doctrine, the Court often has to evaluate social 
scientific studies linking adult entertainment to crime. See id. 
132 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. For example, the social scientific question of whether the death 
penalty actually affected homicide rates was central to some of the justices’ opinions in the 1972 deci-
sion Furman v. Georgia and the Court’s 1976 decision Gregg v. Georgia. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 182 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250–51 & n.15 (1972) (Douglass, J., concurring); 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 307 n.7 (Stewart, J., concurring). For an excellent discussion of this social scien-
tific debate and its influence on Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence, see JOHN MONAHAN & 
LAURENS WALKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 219–39 (2006). 
133 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 132, at 95–144. The hold-
ing in the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, which abolished 
segregation in schools, referenced several social scientific studies about the psychological effects of 
segregation on children. See 347 U.S. 483, 489 & n.4 (1954). 
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1. The Court as Antitrust Rulemaker 
The Sherman Act is short and vague, almost constitutional, in its con-
demnation of restraints of trade and monopolization.134 Courts and commenta-
tors alike have interpreted this vagueness as a broad delegation of regulatory 
power to the courts to reduce the Act’s broad language into applicable rules 
governing firm behavior.135 The Court derives this power from the widely ac-
cepted idea that Congress intended the Sherman Act to be a common law stat-
ute.136 Proponents of this view, including the Court itself,137 suggest that only 
common law rulemaking can respond to the diverse business practices that 
arise over time in response to changes in the economy and innovation in prod-
uct development and distribution.138 If the target of antitrust regulation 
evolves, the rules themselves need to evolve too.139 Once the Sherman Act be-
came known as a charter for economic efficiency, its flexibility became doubly 
important. Economic beliefs about the efficiency of certain business practices, 
like the practices themselves, evolve over time. The Act needs to be flexible 
enough to adapt to these shifts in economics.140 
                                                                                                                                       
134 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). Indeed the Court has emphasized interpretive sim-
ilarities between the Sherman Act and the Constitution. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933) (“As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality 
and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.”). 
135 Lemos, supra note 128, at 410. This view of the Sherman Act has its prominent critics. See 
Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 263, 270 (1986); David F. Shores, Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 MO. L. 
REV. 725, 791 (2001). Nonetheless it seems to have carried the day; the Court continues to invoke its 
power to make and change antitrust rules with the same free hand it enjoys in its constitutional inter-
pretation. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“Just as 
the common law adapts to modern understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman 
Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic condi-
tions.” (alteration in original)). 
136 See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 46 (2d ed. 1974) (“[T]he Sherman Act [is] . . . a gen-
eral authority to do what common law courts usually do: to use certain customary techniques of judi-
cial reasoning . . . and to develop, refine, and innovate in the dynamic common law tradition.”); Wil-
liam F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of 
Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982) (“Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legis-
lation that has permitted a common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by 
only the most general statutory directions.”). In legislative debates over the Act, Senator John Sher-
man himself observed that “it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful 
and unlawful combinations . . . . All that we, as lawmakers, can do is declare general principles.” 21 
CONG. REC. 2460 (1889) (statement of Sen. John Sherman). 
137 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899 (“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a 
common-law statute.”); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (referring to antitrust as a 
“quasi-common law realm”). 
138 Baxter, supra note 136, at 663. 
139 See id. 
140 Id. at 670 (“An adaptive approach to antitrust law is necessary . . . because of the continuing 
progress of economic theory in explaining why firms pursue certain strategies and the competitive 
consequences of their behavior.”). The economics on which antitrust doctrine rests can be analogized 
to “foundational facts,” which can be defined as “judges’ generalized, but invisible, intuitions about 
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Legal change in antitrust is largely driven by the Supreme Court, with the 
lower courts often playing only a modest role in antitrust reform.141 In part, 
this is because most of the major changes to antitrust law since the 1970s have 
involved eliminating per se rules condemning business conduct.142 Without 
any room for argument, firms avoided these practices, giving rise to relatively 
few opportunities for the lower courts to reconsider the rules.143 Even when 
they did, the per se nature of the rules tied lower courts’ hands.144 With this 
top-down model of legal change, it is unsurprising that many of the economic 
concepts now common in antitrust jurisprudence first appeared in Supreme 
Court opinions before any mention in courts below.145 
Although the Court cannot initiate rulemaking without a case or contro-
versy raising the issue, it enjoys significant control over its regulatory agenda 
and the content of its rules.146 The Court receives as many as a dozen petitions 
for certiorari each year raising antitrust issues,147 and the Court can select 
among them according to its regulatory preferences.148 In addition to being 
                                                                                                                                       
how the world works.” Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 145, 146. Although economics is neither merely intuitive nor invisible in the Court’s antitrust 
jurisprudence, it is the shifting factual background that forms the basis for believing a rule is efficient, 
fair, or effective in much the same way that foundational facts form the basis for the Court’s equal 
protection and pleading standards. See id. But the distinction is crucial; with foundational facts, invis-
ibility contributes to illegitimate decision making. See id. According to this framework, acknowledged 
doctrinal shifts citing evolving factual beliefs (such as Leegin and Khan) are relatively legitimate 
exercises of judicial power. See id. at 151–54. 
141 See Andrew I. Gavil, A First Look at the Powell Papers: Sylvania and the Process of Change 
in the Supreme Court, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 8, 9. For example, when the Court overruled Schwinn 
in Sylvania, it was not responding to any “pronounced conflict in the circuits.” Id. 
142 See Blair & Lopatka, supra note 1, at 552–54. 
143 See id. (explaining that per se antitrust rules are relatively infrequently litigated because par-
ties have a strong incentive to avoid the prohibited conduct). 
144 See, e.g., PSKS v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. Civ.A. 2:03-CV-107, 2004 WL 
5254322, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2004) (denying defendant’s motion for a new trial because 
“[w]hether the per se classification of [RPM] agreements is wise is not for this court to decide”), aff’d, 
171 F. App’x 464 (5th Cir. 2006), rev’d and rem’d, 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
145 Cross-elasticity of demand was first used by the Court to define the boundaries of a market in 
1954’s Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States. 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1954); see Gregory 
J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 130 (1992). Similar-
ly, the Supreme Court was the first court to discuss the single monopoly profit theorem (although it 
did not call it by that name) in Jefferson Parish. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2, 26 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Likewise, the competitive implications of free riding 
were first discussed in Sylvania. See 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977). 
146 See PERRY, supra note 5, at 11 (“While it is true that a legitimate case or controversy must ex-
ist and be appealed, this requirement is not really much of a constraint if the Court does not want it to 
be. Virtually any issue the Court might want to resolve is offered to it.”). 
147 See Thomas G. Hungar & Ryan G. Koopmans, Appellate Advocacy in Antitrust Cases: Les-
sons from the Supreme Court, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 53, 53 (“From September 2002 to October 
2008, 94 petitions were filed that presented issues of antitrust law . . . .”). 
148 See Gavil, supra note 141, at 9. Indeed, Justice Powell’s papers reveal that he was looking for 
an opportunity to overturn Schwinn when the petition for certiorari was filed for the Sylvania case in 
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able to select an area for engagement, the Court enjoys a relatively free hand in 
designing and changing antitrust rules once it grants certiorari in a case.149 
Stare decisis, at least according to the Court, is of small concern in antitrust 
cases;150 indeed the Court has explicitly overruled four antitrust cases since the 
1970s.151 
2. The Justices as Antitrust Economists 
As primary antitrust rulemaker, the Court has tremendous power in regu-
lating competition, but this power also puts the inexpert Court in a difficult 
position. Good rulemaking requires knowledge of background facts about the 
social costs and benefits of conduct and whether a given rule will encourage or 
prevent that conduct. In antitrust, as in many areas of law, those background 
facts are scientific and technical. To make matters worse, they are often theo-
retical; the economic concepts that have proved the most influential on anti-
trust policy have not been (and perhaps cannot be) proved in an experimental 
sense.152 As in any area of law where it has primary rulemaking authority that 
requires scientific or technical knowledge, the Court experiences an expertise 
deficit. Expertise from outside the Court must fill that void. 
It is obvious that in antitrust cases the Court draws on external economic 
expertise; its opinions explicitly cite scholarly works as well as amicus briefs 
prepared by economists.153 But less clear is how the Court chooses between 
conflicting economic theories and empirical propositions. Because the best 
way to choose between competing scientific propositions—actual engagement 
with the science itself—is unavailable to lay justices, they must evaluate eco-
nomic arguments using secondary criteria, such as whether most economists 
                                                                                                                                       
1976. Id. Through forceful advocacy, the justice was able to convince others to grant the petition, and, 
ultimately, overrule what he saw as a misguided precedent. Id. 
149 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899. 
150 See id. (“[T]he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has 
less force with respect to the Sherman Act.” (alteration in original) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997))). 
151 See id. at 907 (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911)); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 46 (2006) (overruling Int’l Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947)); Khan, 522 U.S. at 22 (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 
390 U.S. 145 (1968)); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59 (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 
388 U.S. 365 (1967)). 
152 See Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 
1932 (2009) (“Empiricism has its limits in antitrust, as it does everywhere else. Many antitrust judg-
ments are not Popperian—they cannot be falsified or proven.”); William H. Page, The Chicago School 
and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. 
L. REV. 1221, 1300 (1989) (“The acceptance of a theory by economists or by courts cannot await 
empirical proof, because full verification is impossible . . . .”). 
153 See, e.g., Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 46 (citing an amicus brief, Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) guidelines, and various scholarly works); ; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.495 
U.S. 328, 343 n.13 (1990) (citing various scholarly works dating back to 1966). 
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believe the proposition or whether it has been published and peer-reviewed. 
Delay can improve the Court’s second-order information about an economic 
argument. 
B. The Informational Benefits of Delay 
Given the importance of getting the economics right, and given the 
Court’s economic inexpertise, delayed rulemaking in the face of new economic 
theories and findings may actually be a good thing. It helps the Court use con-
sensus among economists—consensus being the best possible second-order 
sign of scientific reliability—in evaluating economic ideas. 
1. The Informational Value of Consensus 
Truth may be a slippery concept in science, but scientific debate over time 
resolves itself into widely accepted paradigms; in one observer’s words, 
“[s]cience converges.”154 These points of agreement—although contingent, 
socially constructed, and ultimately temporary—pass for scientific truth.155 If 
getting the underlying science “right” is essential to regulation (as it almost 
always is), then regulators should regard these points of consensus as facts.156 
It is unsurprising, then, that the Court often invokes consensus among academ-
ics as a reason for incorporating an economic concept into an antitrust rule.157 
                                                                                                                                       
154 Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 724 (1992). 
155 Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 JURIMETRICS 
J. 345, 347 (1992) (“[S]cience is socially constructed. According to a persuasive body of work, the 
‘facts’ that scientists present to the rest of the world are not simple reflections of nature; rather, these 
‘facts’ are produced by human agency . . . .”). See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996) (providing the original and perhaps still most influential 
account of paradigms and their relationship to scientific truth). 
156 The notion that scientific consensus should be the basis of legal judgment is explicit in admis-
sibility standards for scientific testimony. See infra notes 264–292 and accompanying text. 
157 See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889, 901 (explaining that the “widespread consensus” among 
economists that minimum RPM can promote interbrand competition supported overruling Dr. Miles); 
Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 43 n.4, 44–45 (justifying overruling International Salt by appealing to the 
“vast majority of academic literature [that] recognizes that a patent does not necessarily confer market 
power”); Khan, 522 U.S. at 15 (“[O]ur reconsideration of Albrecht’s continuing validity is informed 
by . . . a considerable body of scholarship discussing the effects of vertical restraints.”). Similarly, the 
Court’s use of treatises and textbooks reflects a preference for adopting consensus views. See, e.g., 
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894 (citing 8 PHILLIP AREEDA & HEBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 47 (2d 
ed. 2004)); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOM-
IC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 134 (1974); ERNEST GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 252 (1976)).Treatises and textbooks, unlike academic journals, tend to report the points of agree-
ment among academics, not the cutting-edge theories and controversial findings that drive the engine 
of scientific progress. 
2014] Benefits of Delaying Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty 351 
2. The Problems with Consensus 
Consensus may be an excellent indicator of social scientific reliability, 
but it is not always a cure-all for the Court’s expertise deficit in antitrust. Con-
sensus among scientists and social scientists is often incomplete or nonexist-
ent, it can be temporary or unstable, and it may be difficult for a lay person to 
recognize. These problems may be especially pronounced in economics, in 
which the dominance of theory and the difficulty of empirical proof make it 
especially difficult to form cohesive and lasting paradigms.158 Thus the inex-
pert policymaker wishing to harness the wisdom of the crowd by searching for 
a consensus among economists will often find none. 
The policymaker faces another challenge as well: even where such a con-
sensus does exist, it can be difficult for a lay person to detect. Consensus is a 
status conferred on an idea by a complex system of citation, discourse, and 
collaboration among academics.159 One cannot simply call the scientific prop-
osition with the most adherents or academic citations the “consensus” posi-
tion.160 Detecting consensus may itself require expertise.161 
To make matters even more difficult for courts, the adversarial process 
can distort consensus where it does exist.162 The stakes are high for the regu-
lated, so those whose business interests align with a non-consensus position 
                                                                                                                                       
158 See R.H. Coase, How Should Economists Choose?, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONO-
MISTS 15, 32 (1994); Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSI-
TIVE ECONOMICS 3, 11 (1953). As Milton Friedman observed: 
The denial to economics of the dramatic and direct evidence of the “crucial” experiment 
does hinder the adequate testing of hypotheses; but this is much less significant than the 
difficulty it places in the way of achieving a reasonably prompt and wide spread con-
sensus on the conclusions justified by the available evidence. It renders the weeding-out 
of unsuccessful hypotheses slow and difficult. They are seldom downed for good and 
are always cropping up again. 
Freidman, supra. Similarly, Ronald Coase observed that since the acceptability of theories to the eco-
nomic community varies with such complex social factors as political values and the salience of eco-
nomic disasters and threats, a diversity of economic views will persist. See Coase, supra. 
159 See Jasanoff, supra note 155, at 354–55. 
160 Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus in 
the Battle of the Experts, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1261, 1300–01 (2012). Nor does consensus require 
unanimity. Indeed, all but the most incontrovertible scientific propositions have their dissenters; in the 
social sciences, unanimity is probably especially rare. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 845 (2007) (Breyer J., dissenting). That courts should recognize consensus 
positions does not require the law to wait for an issue to be past all controversy. See id. (“If we are to 
insist upon unanimity in the social science literature before finding a compelling interest, we might 
never find one.”). 
161 Haw, supra note 160, at 1300–01. 
162 See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1130. At least one distorting 
effect of the adversarial system on expert evidence, the problem of expert allegiance to the side retain-
ing them, has been empirically demonstrated. See Daniel C. Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Bi-
ased by the Side That Retained Them?, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1889, 1890 (2013). 
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have an incentive to push their view as the consensus position, or, if that fails, 
at least to convince the policymaker that the issue is seriously up for debate.163 
3. Delay and Consensus 
If consensus among economists is incomplete, unstable, or difficult to de-
tect, it will be a problematic criterion for the Court to use in separating the 
good economic arguments from the bad. When this is true at time one, the 
Court may improve its information when it puts off rulemaking until time 
two.164 If there is significant disagreement about a new economic theory, delay 
simply gives the academy a chance to form a consensus.165 If there is substan-
tial scientific agreement on a question, then delay allows the Court to test the 
stability of that consensus over time.166 Finally, when the Court cannot tell 
whether experts agree or disagree on a new idea at time one, delay allows the 
Court to use an idea’s staying power as a proxy for its mainstream status at 
time two.167 
a. Giving Scientists Time to Form a Consensus 
Building consensus among scientists can take a significant amount of 
time. The scientific method is inherently conservative; a significant amount of 
contrary data must accumulate before a mainstream belief is rejected in favor 
of a new paradigm.168 Perhaps this is why Nobel Prizes in the sciences tend to 
be awarded at the end of careers, when it is clear that a recipient’s ideas have 
gained sufficient traction to be worthy of recognition.169 Delay allows new ide-
                                                                                                                                       
163 See Haw, supra note 160, at 1268–70. 
164 One scholar suggests that the Court’s delay improves the legitimacy of its shift by allowing 
the background facts to become “uncontested” (although perhaps that is a strong word) before altering 
a rule. See Sherry, supra note 140, at 152–54. 
165 See infra notes 168–171 and accompanying text. 
166 See infra notes 172–176 and accompanying text. 
167 See infra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
168 See KUHN, supra note 155, at 65 (“By ensuring that the paradigm will not be too easily sur-
rendered, resistance guarantees that scientists will not be lightly distracted . . . .”). 
169 Milton Friedman was given the award in 1976, largely for his work on monetarism in the 1950s. 
Milton Friedman: A Heavyweight Champ, at Five Foot Two, ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2006), http://www.
economist.com/node/8313925, archived at http://perma.cc/3BKE-933A. Ronald Coase was awarded a 
Nobel Prize in 1991 for work he completed in the 1930s through the 1960s. Robert Hahn, Ronald Harry 
Coase, 502 NATURE 449, 449 (2013). And John Nash was awarded the prize in 1994 for his work on 
game theory in the 1950s, although his mental illness was at least part of the reason for the delay. Harold 
W. Kuhn et al., The Work of John Nash in Game Theory, in NOBEL LECTURES, ECONOMIC SCIENCES 
1991–1995, at 160, 165 (Torsten Persson ed., 1997). In the natural sciences, where the “crucial experi-
ment” is possible, Nobel Prizes, along with the implicit judgment that a scientist was “right,” can come 
more quickly. See All Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_
prizes/chemistry/laureates/, archived at http://perma.cc/BJ47-QUKK (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). For 
example, the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1996 was awarded to three scientists for an experiment they 
performed in 1985 proving the existence of Buckminsterfullerene. See H.W. Kroto et al., C60: Buckmin-
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as to percolate in the academy between time one, when the Court declines to 
make or change a rule in response to a new scientific idea, and time two, when 
the Court, armed with the knowledge that the idea enjoys consensus status 
among scientists, changes the rule. 
The academic opinion on market-share discounts may be in this pre-
consensus stage, which perhaps can account for at least part of the Court’s re-
luctance to make a rule governing the practice. Although eighteen scholars 
signed an amicus brief advocating the position that market-share discounts 
provide a net benefit to consumers by providing lower prices,170 ample eco-
nomic literature takes the view that these discounts can be, and often are, used 
to anticompetitive effect.171 
b. Observing the Stability of a Consensus 
Delay also allows the Court to observe the stability of consensus over 
time. As the history of science illustrates, consensus positions can be wrong.172 
A new theory can gain traction quickly, perhaps because it provides a simple, 
elegant explanation for phenomena and has attractive policy implications.173 
But as further investigation by the scientific community produces results in-
consistent with it, or a major social event calls it into question, the scientific 
community rejects it.174 This process of rejecting a scientific paradigm takes 
time, because the scientific process places the burden on the heretic to recruit 
believers away from the mainstream belief.175 
Older consensus positions are more scientifically reliable, since they have 
likely withstood sustained attacks from skeptics. And often the idea will be-
come more sophisticated and refined in the interim. Thus putting off rulemak-
ing at time one—even when it seems clear that a new consensus position is 
emerging or has recently emerged—may improve the decision-making process 
if it enables a later decision at time two when that consensus has reached ma-
turity. For example, the Court’s inertial response to arguments in favor of RPM 
                                                                                                                                       
sterfullerene, 318 NATURE 162, 163 (1985); All Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, supra. Economists may take 
even longer to form a consensus than others because the discipline is not as susceptible to empirical proof 
as the natural sciences and experimentally driven social sciences like psychology. 
170 Scholars’ Amicus Brief, supra note 117, at 11. 
171 See Crane, supra note 115, at 255 & n.14. 
172 KUHN, supra note 155, at 77 (explaining that accepted scientific theories may later be reject-
ed). 
173 Economic fads that follow this pattern are both common and unavoidable, because missteps 
are inevitable in an area of study as complex as economics. 
174 KUHN, supra note 155, at 77–91 (discussing the scientific process of rejecting flawed para-
digms). 
175 See id. 
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in the 1970s and 1980s allowed it to test the robustness of the emerging eco-
nomic consensus that the practice had significant procompetitive uses.176 
c. Inferring Consensus from the Age of an Idea 
Where recognizing consensus at a given moment in time can be difficult 
for a lay person, either because the consensus-forming process is opaque or 
because adversarial investigation into consensus tends to obscure it, observing 
expert opinion over time can help reveal points of agreement.177 Delay makes 
this intertemporal perspective possible. 
Even without knowing how many scientists adhere to a particular eco-
nomic theory, a theory’s durability can vouch for its reliability. The fact that 
many distinguished scientists still use or engage with an old theory provides a 
strong signal that it reflects mainstream thinking because it has withstood the 
ultimate scientific test: the test of time. On this view, the durability of an idea 
is a third-order criterion for its scientific reliability; durability tends to indicate 
consensus, which in turn indicates scientific merit. Thus, the Court citing out-
of-date sources, like Robert Bork’s 1978 The Antitrust Paradox in its 2007 
Leegin decision, may be seen as an appeal to the inherent authority of old ide-
as, so long as they have not been discredited.178 
C. Delay and the Common Law Method 
If the Sherman Act is a “common law” statute, then the Court’s interpreta-
tion of it should harness the benefits of conservative legal change. The “quasi-
common law” status of the Sherman Act is usually invoked to illustrate that the 
Court enjoys a free hand in antitrust rulemaking.179 But the common law, just 
like any other rulemaking medium, constrains.180 The common law can evolve 
over time, but change is typically limited to small incremental shifts, one case 
                                                                                                                                       
176 See supra notes 65–87 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s refusals to change its 
RPM rules in the 1970s and 1980s). The 1983 FTC report on RPM is tentative in identifying an eco-
nomic consensus against the per se rule: “Since 1975 the prevailing consensus among economists, to 
the extent that it can be inferred from the current literature, would appear to have moved somewhat 
further toward the view that the current rule of law is overly restrictive.” OVERSTREET, supra note 64, 
at 8. In contrast, by the time the Court decided Leegin in 2007, the consensus on RPM was not only 
robust, but also old. See id. 
177 See supra notes 159–163 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty for laypeople in de-
termining scientific consensus). 
178 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889, 897 (citing BORK, supra note 46, at 292, 294). 
179 Leegin, 551 U.S., at 899; Baxter, supra note 136, at 663. 
180 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
927 (1996) (“[T]he common law method has a centuries-long record of restraining judges.”). 
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at a time.181 At least theoretically, common law’s conservatism tends towards 
accurate (factually and morally) decisions and efficient rules.182 
As a conservatizing force, judicial delay operates in the common law spir-
it even if it sometimes runs afoul of traditional common law strictures like in-
crementalism and robust forms of stare decisis. Moreover, where delay and 
traditional common law methodology diverge, delay may actually lead to bet-
ter outcomes because it harnesses the benefits of judicial restraint while avoid-
ing the myopia that sometimes plagues the common law. 
1. Traditional Conservative Forces in Common Law Rulemaking 
Three features of traditional common law decision making—stare decisis, 
incrementalism, and the cases and controversies requirement—exemplify the 
method’s conservatism.183 By placing a thumb on the scale in favor of the sta-
tus quo while also allowing gradual change, these features ensure rule stability 
and, under some conditions, can promote rule accuracy.184 
a. Common Law’s Status Quo Defaults: Stare Decisis, Incrementalism, and 
Justiciability 
The Court’s commitment to stare decisis—the principle that past deci-
sions should not be revisited—creates a status quo default with an obvious 
conservatizing effect.185 Of course, stare decisis is a norm, not a rule, and the 
Court can and does overturn precedent as Leegin and Khan illustrate.186 Stare 
decisis may best be understood as a presumption in favor of old rules that can 
be overcome only in unusual circumstances.187 Specifically, a significant 
change in circumstance that renders a rule obviously wrong or inefficient can 
justify its revision.188 
                                                                                                                                       
181 Id. at 930. 
182 See id. at 927. See generally Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 51 (1977) (providing a more modern view of common law’s efficiency); Adrian Vermeule, 
Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007) (provid-
ing an excellent summary and critique of traditional Burkean theories of common law optimality). 
183 See infra notes 185–193 and accompanying text. 
184 See infra notes 194–213 and accompanying text. 
185 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). 
186 Id. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that stare decisis is “not an inexorable 
command.” See id.; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also Daniel A. Farber, The 
Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1175 (2006) (“Stare decisis seeks to 
preserve stability, but the doctrine must also leave room for innovation and correction of error.”); 
Philip P. Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 
CONST. COMM. 123, 127 (1985) (“[S]tare decisis is not a strict command in constitutional cases.”). 
187 See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235; Payne, 501 U.S. at 828. 
188 See Frickey, supra note 186, at 128 (noting that the Court justifies overruling cases on, among 
other factors, “changed conditions that have undermined the basis for the overruled decision”); Randy 
356 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:331 
Because stare decisis discourages comprehensive revisions to existing 
rules, incremental change is the common law’s favored mode of rule adjust-
ment.189 The common law’s commitment to incremental change reflects a be-
lief that although legal change is valuable, its optimal process is slow and de-
centralized; major doctrinal shifts are possible, but they happen slowly and 
must be achieved through collective judicial action.190 
Finally, all judicial decision making is subject to the Constitution’s cases 
and controversies requirement that prohibits rulemaking outside of actual con-
crete disputes.191 This branch of the justiciability requirement creates a status 
quo default by forcing judges to be reactive—not proactive—in their rules and 
limits their holdings to the facts of a particular case.192 For courts with selec-
tive jurisdiction, like the Supreme Court, the cases and controversies require-
ment slows the execution of any regulatory agenda by forcing the Court to wait 
for an appropriate case presenting the issue in an ideal posture.193 
b. Status Quo Defaults, Rule Stability, and Accuracy 
Conservatism’s effect on rule stability is straightforward: status quo de-
faults slow the pace of legal change, affording regulated parties the predictabil-
ity necessary to organize their affairs within the limits of the law. The efficien-
cy gains from predictable, stable rules cannot be overstated, and are especially 
important in the antitrust context where the engine of commerce depends on 
firms knowing the rules of the game.194 Stare decisis means regulated parties 
can view existing Supreme Court cases as reliable precedent, which allows 
them to invest in policies and procedures that place them on the right side of 
the case law.195 And for parties actually involved in a dispute, the common 
law’s preference for incremental change provides some assurance that their 
conduct will be judged according to rules substantially identical to those cur-
rently on the books. The cases and controversies requirement contributes to 
                                                                                                                                       
J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 426–430 (2010) (identify-
ing the role of “evolving understandings” in overturning existing Supreme Court precedent). 
189 See Vermuele, supra note 182, at 1487. 
190 See id. (identifying a strain of Burkean common law theory that praises the “value of small-
scale incremental change as opposed to sudden large-scale change, and the related idea that institu-
tions evolving incrementally over time are more likely to be optimal than designed institutions”). 
191 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
192 See id. 
193 See PERRY, supra note 5, at 234–39 (observing that a case that provides a bad vehicle for mak-
ing a legal change, especially when a better case may be in the pipeline, tends to result in denial of 
certiorari). 
194 See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 49, 85 (2007) (emphasizing the benefits of certainty for businesses in the antitrust context); 
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 
1422–29 (2009) (same). 
195 See Crane, supra note 194, at 85; Stucke, supra note 194, at 1422. 
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stability by putting the brakes on legal change, and preventing rule revision not 
made absolutely necessary by concrete disputes. 
The common law’s commitment to conservatism has a more complicated 
effect on rule accuracy. A status quo default is wrong whenever the status quo 
is wrong. According to traditional theories of the common law, existing rules 
have a special claim to accuracy because the judicial process that created them 
tends towards optimal results.196 According to these theories, the conservatism 
embodied in stare decisis, incrementalism, and the cases and controversies re-
quirement leads to more accurate rules in the long run than an alternative sys-
tem that permits centralized, unconstrained rulemaking.197 But contemporary 
scholars have attacked the traditional view, arguing that the common law pro-
cess is often inferior to its less constrained alternatives.198 On this view that 
relaxes the assumption that existing rules are more likely to be accurate than 
new ones formed out of whole-cloth, conservatism’s salutary effect on rule 
accuracy disappears. 
The traditional view of common law accuracy holds that a common law 
rule’s very existence is evidence that it is right, or at least superior to alterna-
tives without its pedigree.199 Theorists posit two kinds of arguments for why 
this is so. First, a common law rule is especially likely to be right because it is 
the product of many generations of judicial minds, and so embodies the wis-
dom of the crowd.200 If judges are only boundedly rational, then an inter-
temporal aggregation of their judgments is superior to a single judge’s recon-
sideration of a rule.201 Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. described a judge’s 
contribution to the common law in these terms: “No one knows better than I do 
the countless number of great intellects that have spent themselves in making 
some addition or improvement, the greatest of which is trifling when compared 
with the mighty whole.”202 
                                                                                                                                       
196 See supra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining the accuracy benefits of the common 
law). 
197 See supra notes 185–193 and accompanying text. 
198 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006); 
Vermeule, supra note 182, at 1482–83; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY 
MINDS 92 (2009) (arguing that “the argument for Burkean minimalism is much stronger in some areas 
than in others”). 
199 See Vermuele, supra note 182, at 1487. 
200 See, e.g, SUNSTEIN, supra note 198, at 51, 94 (identifying Burke’s account of many minds tra-
ditionalism as “aggregative” and connecting it to the Condorcet Jury Theorem); Vermeule, supra note 
182, at 1485–1517 (situating Burkean minimalism in context of “many minds” arguments). 
201 See Strauss, supra note 180, at 894 (arguing that “traditionalism is a recognition of bounded 
rationality”); see also Farber, supra note 186, at 1178 (calling deference to past decisions an attitude 
of “humility”). 
202 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473 (1897). 
358 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:331 
The second kind of argument for a common law rule’s accuracy is that it 
is the product of a competitive process that tends towards optimal results.203 
The metaphor here is Darwinian evolution, in which the incremental changes 
that define common law rulemaking operate like genetic mutations; the good 
survive, while the bad fall away. According to this view, the common law’s 
development is teleological; it trends towards perfection, or, as Lord Mansfield 
famously said, it “works itself pure.”204 If the common law process is governed 
by the survival of the fittest, then the very existence of a common law rule 
suggests that it is fit. Judges deviate from these rules at their peril. 
Contemporary theorists have attacked these claims of status quo accuracy 
by observing that the common law process is subject to serious flaws that un-
dermine both the evolutionary and the many minds models of legal change.205 
First, critics like Fred Schauer argue that limiting lawmaking to individual cas-
es does not harness the wisdom of the crowd or promote teleological legal 
change, but rather it distorts judicial decisions.206 According to Schauer, the 
cases and controversies requirement forces judges to make rules of general 
applicability out of particular, idiosyncratic facts.207 This means a judge must 
guess “the extent to which the case before her [is] representative of the larger 
class of which it is a member,” a particularly difficult task given the availabil-
ity bias created by the facts of the instant case.208 This point—that cases make 
bad law—undercuts the “many minds” theories of the common law. If judges 
have bad information, aggregating their “wisdom” cannot promote rule accu-
racy. 
Second, other critics argue that the common law’s path-dependency con-
strains the practical operation of the evolutionary mechanism that supposedly 
works the law pure.209 By limiting legal change to small, case-by-case incre-
ments, common law rules can only develop along existing lines of reasoning 
on a particular regulatory problem.210 Path-dependency means that a common 
                                                                                                                                       
203 Perhaps the most influential account of the evolutionary efficiency of the common law is 
found in 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973). See 
also SUNSTEIN, supra note 198, at 107–11 (discussing Hayek’s evolutionary account of the common 
law); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 33–36 (2009) (same). Edmund Burke’s 
theory of traditionalism can also be understood as relying on an evolutionary model. See Vermeule, 
supra note 182, at 1518–32 (discussing “Burke as Darwin”). 
204 Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch.); 1 Atk 21. 
205 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 198, at 884; Vermeule, supra note 182, at 1482–83. 
206 See Schauer, supra note 198, at 905. 
207 Id. at 893. 
208 Id. at 894. 
209 See VERMEULE, supra note 203, at 109–10; cf. Vermeule, supra note 182, at 1521–22 (noting 
that where an environment changes more rapidly than an evolutionary process can, incremental 
change may yield inefficient results). 
210 Holmes described the common law’s path dependency as a pattern of obsolescence and re-
birth: 
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law rule can only achieve its local maximum, defined as the best possible rule 
achievable by incremental change.211 But a local maximum is not necessarily 
an absolute maximum, as there may not be a continuous, monotonic path from 
the existing rule to the optimal rule.212 The best rule can perhaps only be 
achieved by leaping to a different line of reasoning with more potential for 
solving a regulatory problem. When that is true, a decision-making process 
unfettered by the status quo will yield better results than the common law.213 
Thus, whether common law’s conservatism tends towards accurate rules 
depends on the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the evolutionary 
and many minds theories of legal change as well as the scope of the problems 
identified by these critics. Resolving this debate as to conservatism in general 
is beyond the scope of this Article. But as demonstrated below, the specific 
brand of conservatism explored in this Article—delaying rulemaking in re-
sponse to scientific change—exploits the possible informational advantages of 
common law conservatism while avoiding its hazards. As a result, not only 
does delay certainly contribute to rule stability, it also probably promotes rule 
accuracy. 
2. Delay as a Conservative Force in Rulemaking 
Judicial delay in response to scientific change provides many of the bene-
fits claimed for common law rulemaking while avoiding or mitigating some of 
its flaws. At time one, when the Court stays its hand, its conservatism pro-
motes legal stability and predictability. At time two, when the Court takes ac-
tion in recognition of scientific reality, its use of delay allows it to act with bet-
ter scientific information and a broader perspective on the regulatory issue than 
is usually possible in common law rulemaking. 
This judicial delay is consistent with the principle of stare decisis. When 
the Court uses delay, it may seem to exhibit a different attitude towards stare 
decisis at time one, when the Court follows it, than at time two, when the 
                                                                                                                                       
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or formula. In the 
course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. . . . 
Some ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with 
the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which has 
been found for it, and it enters on a new career. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881). 
211 VERMEULE, supra note 203, at 109–10. 
212 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 
1014 (2008) (“Incremental steps are easier than top-down planning, but they can only take one up to a 
local maximum, which, in any reasonably complex environment, is unlikely to be the global maxi-
mum.”). 
213 See id. Legislation may be just such a process, because “statutes can innovate more rapidly 
and completely than the common law.” VERMEULE, supra note 203, at 109. 
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Court flouts it. But recall that even the strongest version of stare decisis gives 
way when changed circumstances render a rule clearly erroneous.214 The pas-
sage of time, by providing information about scientific consensus, can provide 
those changed circumstances that make strict adherence to stare decisis at time 
two unjustifiable. Thus, when the Court’s delay in its RPM jurisprudence is 
viewed from this angle, Justice Breyer’s criticism of the Leegin majority has 
less bite. He argued that overturning Dr. Miles when “nothing [was] new” with 
respect to the economic literature offended stare decisis.215 This argument ig-
nores the fact that the maturation of an existing idea may itself be a relevant 
changed circumstance. 
This attitude that stare decisis requires abstention at time one and action 
at time two promotes legal stability by slowing change, and, perhaps most im-
portantly, by preventing legal flip-flopping. Less or no delay in reacting to sci-
entific change creates a risk of rapid, successive reversals and little stability 
and predictability for the regulated. If the interval between time one and time 
two provides valuable information about the scientific reliability of an idea, 
then a rule change at time one may need to be undone at time two when it be-
comes clear that the idea has been rejected by the scientific community.216 The 
stability cost of a flip-flop is twice that of a single major change in law, and if 
the weight of scientific opinion reverses more than once before settling on a 
consensus, the social costs are even higher.217 
Judicial delay eschews incremental change in favor of no change at time 
one, followed by a large change at time two.218 But incrementalism and delay 
have something in common: both ensure that change occurs over a long 
timeframe. Consequently, both models of legal change realize conservatism’s 
salutary effects on legal stability and predictability. At the same time, delayed 
rulemaking also avoids some of the informational infirmities of incremental-
ism. Recall that the best-case scenario for incrementalism is that it pushes the 
law toward the best rule within a line of reasoning.219 But an entirely different 
                                                                                                                                       
214 See supra notes 185–188 and accompanying text. 
215 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 921 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
216 Perhaps the risk of flip-flopping underlies the claim that judicial minimalism is optimal under 
conditions of severe uncertainty. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 57 (1999) (“Minimal-
ism becomes more attractive . . . when judges are proceeding in the midst of . . . factual . . . uncertain-
ty and rapidly changing circumstances . . . .”). 
217 Legal flip-flopping was a particular problem in the early days of DNA identification evidence, 
when state supreme courts went back and forth on the admissibility of the evidence. See REBECCA C. 
HARRIS, BLACK ROBES, WHITE COATS 36 (2008). In a period of twelve years (1991–2003), four state 
supreme courts flip-flopped on the admissibility of DNA evidence; each court first established a per-
missive rule approving of DNA profiling, then a rule narrowing or abolishing its use in courts, before 
finally returning to the initial permissive rule. See id. 
218 See also Leegin, 551 U.S. at 928 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for 
abandoning common law’s commitment to incrementalism). 
219 See supra notes 209–213 and accompanying text. 
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approach to a regulatory problem—an approach that cannot be effected with-
out large-scale change—may be superior to what is possible with incremental 
change. Large-scale change at time two allows for this kind of big-picture revi-
sion.220 
Finally, judicial delay provides similar benefits to the cases and contro-
versies requirement while also helping to mitigate its adverse effects.221 Both 
delay and the cases and controversies requirement slow legal change, so they 
offer similar benefits as those provided by all conservatizing devices. But de-
lay can also alleviate judicial myopia, one of the serious side effects of the cas-
es and controversies requirement. Delay allows the Court a broader perspective 
than just one case or controversy; when it changes the rule (at time two) it has 
at least two data points (time one and time two).222 And if the Court passes on 
multiple opportunities to change a rule, as it did in its RPM jurisprudence, it 
can observe a constellation of controversies that ought to be covered by the 
new rule. So while all judicial decision making is subject to the cases and con-
troversies requirement, delay can counter-act the judicial myopia of that re-
quirement by providing the Court with a broader, intertemporal perspective on 
regulatory questions. 
III. JUDGMENT WITHOUT DELAY: TOXIC TORTS COMPARED 
Delay can have a salutary effect on the quantity and quality of scientific 
information available to legal decisionmakers, but it also can have tremendous 
costs. And because the costs of delay vary with the context of the legal deci-
sion, different contexts have different optimal amounts of delay in the face of 
changing scientific realities. Indeed, in the context of antitrust rulemaking at 
the Supreme Court, the costs of delay may be particularly low, suggesting that 
the optimal amount of lag between scientific and legal change is relatively 
long. This Part discusses toxic torts, a legal context at the opposite end of the 
spectrum, where the cost of delay is great and thus the optimal amount of delay 
is shorter.223 In the context of tort trials, significant judicial delay would create 
                                                                                                                                       
220 Further, large-scale changes at time two can help ensure that the law moves apace with chang-
ing circumstances, unlike incremental change which has no guarantee of moving with the requisite 
speed. See VERMEULE, supra note 203, at 108–09 (observing that where the evolutionary process of 
the common law cannot keep apace with environmental changes, statutory regulation—because of its 
ability to quickly adapt to circumstances—may be optimal). 
221 See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text. Additionally, the requirement may actually 
cause delay, since the requirement forces justices to wait for the right case to provide the optimal 
rulemaking vehicle. See PERRY, supra note 5, at 234–39. 
222 Indeed, delay can help the problem of judges being forced to make rules based on specific idi-
osyncratic cases. Schauer, supra note 198, at 915 (suggesting “delaying the very process of rulemak-
ing until enough cases arose such that the rulemaking body could have the benefit of having seen 
multiple examples of some larger problem”). 
223 See infra notes 226–260 and accompanying text. 
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high social costs by undercompensating the injured and underdeterring dan-
gerous conduct.224 This Part aims to prove the benefits of judicial delay by il-
lustrating the high price the law must pay—in legal uncertainty and error—
when other considerations preclude its use.225 
A. Scientific Uncertainty in Toxic Torts: Bendectin and Breast Implants 
The litigation over Bendectin and breast implants are familiar stories 
about the failure of the American tort system.226 In both cases, cautious, incon-
clusive studies raising questions about the products’ safety precipitated a flood 
of lawsuits resulting in millions of dollars of damages for plaintiffs.227 In both 
cases, scientists later formed a strong consensus that the products did not cause 
the injuries alleged in the suits.228 Commentators retell the Bendectin and 
breast implant fiascos as stories about corporate misconduct,229 media hyste-
ria,230 and jury error.231 But these fiascos are also stories about judicial delay, 
or lack thereof, in the face of scientific uncertainty. 
1. Bendectin 
Merrell Dow first marketed Bendectin in 1956 as a treatment for morning 
sickness.232 Doubts about the drug’s safety for pregnant women, however, be-
gan relatively early, starting in 1963 when an in-house toxicological study at 
Merrell revealed that large doses of the drug given to pregnant rabbits caused 
disfigurations in their young.233 The results prompted the principal investigator 
to recommend further study, and in 1966 and 1967, another in-house study re-
sulted in more defects, although those researchers did not attribute them to 
Bendectin.234 In the 1970s, after Bendectin’s formulation was altered, similar 
toxicological studies performed by investigators not associated with Merrell 
                                                                                                                                       
224 See infra notes 261–292 and accompanying text. 
225 See infra notes 293–304 and accompanying text. 
226 See generally MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL (1996) (examining the breast implant liti-
gation of the 1980s and 1990s); MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS (1996) (exam-
ining the Bendectin litigation of the 1970s and 1980s). 
227 See infra notes 241–242, 258–260 and accompanying text. 
228 See infra notes 244–247, 258 and accompanying text. 
229 See GREEN, supra note 226, at 129. 
230 See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 226, at 53 (discussing the role of the media, in particular televi-
sion news anchor Connie Chung, in fueling unfounded fears about implant safety); David E. Bern-
stein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 457, 467–69 (1999) (same). 
231 See ANGELL, supra note 226, at 74–75. 
232 GREEN, supra note 226, at 90–91. 
233 Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin 
Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1993). 
234 Id. 
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resulted in defects, but again, the researchers did not directly attribute those 
defects to the drug.235 
When the parents of David Mekdeci, a baby born with birth defects after 
his mother used Benedictin while pregnant, filed the first suit alleging that 
Bendectin caused birth defects in 1977, only toxicological studies like those 
described above were available.236 Nonetheless, a jury awarded the Mekdecis a 
$20,000 verdict in 1980.237 
The first epidemiological study linking Benedictin to birth defects appeared 
two years later.238 This study tentatively suggested a connection between the 
drug and birth defects, but later studies never replicated its results.239 The com-
bination of this study and the Mekdecis’ success at trial in 1980 opened the 
floodgates of litigation alleging the teratogenic properties of Bendectin.240 Be-
tween 1980 and 1991, eight plaintiffs won jury awards totaling over $133 mil-
lion.241 Merrell Dow also offered an additional $120 million to settle a multidis-
trict case.242 In part because of the increasing price tag of Bendectin litigation, 
Merrell Dow voluntarily withdrew the drug from the market in 1983.243 
The 1979 study and the successful jury verdict for the Mekdecis also 
opened another type of floodgates.244 After 1980, epidemiologists conducted 
dozens of studies investigating the incidence of birth defects among children of 
women taking Bendectin.245 None of these studies found a significant link be-
tween the drug and the defects.246 These studies tipped the scientific opinion 
against the idea that Bendectin was a powerful teratogen, and by the mid-
                                                                                                                                       
235 Id. at 21–22. 
236 See Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat’l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1512 (11th Cir. 1983). 
237 Sanders, supra note 233, at 6. A retrial was later ordered, in which the jury found for the 
defendant. Id. 
238 Id. at 23. Toxicological proof of a drug’s effects is generally considered to be inferior to epi-
demiological evidence, because toxicology studies the effect of exposing lab animals, not humans. 3 
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 22:1 (2012). In contrast, epidemiologi-
cal studies examine a drug’s effect on humans by comparing the incidence of disease among people 
actually prescribed the drug to the incidence among the general population. Id. § 23:1. Although epi-
demiological studies lack the controls that lab-based toxicology studies provide, they are generally 
considered to be more reliable indicators of causation because of the difficulty of extrapolating test 
results from animals to humans. Id. § 22:2; see GREEN, supra note 226, at 35–37. 
239 Sanders, supra 233, at 9 n.27, 23. 
240 Id. at 9; see GREEN, supra note 226, at 159–65. 
241 Sanders, supra 233, at 6. All of the verdicts, however, were eventually set aside or reversed on 
appeal because of the overwhelming consensus that Bendectin does not cause birth defects. Id. at 10; 
see, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 832–33 (D.C. 1994); Blum ex rel. 
Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. 2000); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 
953 S.W.2d 706, 730 (Tex. 1997). 
242 GREEN, supra note 226, at 213. Merrell Dow also spent millions on litigation; one trial alone 
cost it $7 million in litigation costs. Id. at 167. 
243 Sanders, supra 233, at 7. 
244 Id. at 23–24. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 24.  
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1990s, a scientific consensus emerged that Bendectin did not cause birth de-
fects.247 
2. Breast Implants 
The Bendectin fiasco fueled a tort reform movement that was gaining 
momentum when history repeated itself. In the late 1980s, silicone breast im-
plant recipients began to file lawsuits alleging connective tissue disease caused 
by leaking or ruptured implants.248 The suits followed reports that the largest 
manufacturer of silicone breast implants knew, and had not disclosed, that the 
implants frequently leaked silicone gel into the tissues of recipients.249 Further 
fueling the outrage against defendant Dow Corning, it was revealed that the 
manufacturer had not studied the women receiving implants since their advent 
in 1962, and so could not reliably claim that the silicone leakage was harm-
less.250 
Although the suits capitalized on public outrage against Dow Corning’s 
conduct, the pathogenic properties of silicone gel were far from proven.251 
Some toxicological studies showed that mice injected with silicone developed 
inflammation in the injection sites, although scientists disputed the meaning of 
this evidence.252 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) demanded that 
manufacturers produce a study demonstrating the safety of their product by 
July 1991, which the manufacturers were unable to do.253 But neither had any 
study reliably linked implants to human disease.254 As a result of the uncertain-
ty surrounding the safety of silicone implants, the FDA declared a “moratori-
um” on their use in January 1992.255 
As in the Bendectin litigation, the early breast implant plaintiffs recovered 
on thin toxicological evidence of causation.256 The success of the cases precipi-
tated a flood of litigation, which in turn spawned a body of medical research 
that eventually disproved the link between the breast implants and the alleged 
                                                                                                                                       
247 Id. at 23. Of course, proving the harmlessness of Bendectin is a logical impossibility. See 
Mike Redmayne, Scientific Disagreement, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1063 (1997). 
248 See ANGELL, supra note 226, at 57–61. 
249 See id. 
250 See Bernstein, supra note 230, at 462. Some scholars blame this shortcoming on the physi-
cians who did not demand better safety evidence. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants 
Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 705, 715–31. 
251 See ANGELL, supra note 226, at 21. 
252 See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 23–25 & n.121 (1995) (explaining methodological flaws with animal studies and toxicological 
studies). 
253 Bernstein, supra note 230, at 470. 
254 Id. at 470–71. 
255 Id. at 474. 
256 Feldman, supra note 252, at 20. 
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injuries.257 This consensus, solidified by a 1994 Mayo Clinic study published 
in the New England Journal of Medicine,258 emerged only after implant manu-
facturers had paid millions of dollars in damages and settlements259 and had 
offered $4.25 billion to settle the remaining cases.260 
The breast implant saga and Bendectin litigation followed the same pat-
tern of legal response to changing scientific information. In both examples, 
some of the early suits based only on toxicological data succeeded, and the 
success of early suits brought more suits and more research. As the manufac-
turers continued to pay out, the scientific evidence about causation improved. 
Within the scientific community, early fears raised by toxicological results 
were put to rest by more ambitious epidemiological studies showing no link 
between the product and human disease. With the benefit of more and better 
studies, a scientific consensus emerged that the products did not cause the al-
leged injuries. After a time, the law caught up with this consensus, and recov-
ery under theories once successful at trial became impossible. And in both ex-
amples, the errors of the early suits and the period of legal instability and un-
certainty were extremely costly for the defendants who had to pay for injuries 
they did not cause and for the patients who were denied access to what turned 
out to be safe and effective products. 
B. Tort Trial Courts as Gatekeepers: Admissibility,  
Sufficiency, and Delay 
The reactivity of the legal system to new information about Bendectin 
and breast implants is partly a matter of doctrine. Recovery for toxic torts de-
pends on plaintiffs proving that the alleged products, as a general matter, are 
capable of causing their injuries. That question of medical causation is scien-
tific, and so almost always requires the testimony of an expert witness.261 Trial 
judges make two kinds of judgments about scientific evidence of causation: 
first, courts must decide whether the testimony is admissible;262 second, they 
must decide whether the admissible evidence is sufficient to support a jury 
verdict.263 For both determinations, the applicable standards contribute to a 
                                                                                                                                       
257 See Edward K. Cheng, Changing Scientific Evidence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 315, 316–17 (2003). 
258 See id. 
259 See Bernstein, supra note 230, at 479. Although it is impossible to know how much the firms 
spent in settlements, see Feldman, supra note 252, at 19, single trials awards against manufacturers in 
excess of $25 million were not unheard of. See Bernstein, supra note 230, at 479. 
260 See Feldman, supra note 252, at 21–23. Although the manufacturers agreed to this sum, the 
settlement collapsed when too many implant recipients came forward with claims. See id. 
261 See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 238, §§ 22:1–:2 (discussing the role of medical expert testi-
mony in proving causation). 
262 See infra notes 264–281 and accompanying text. 
263 See infra notes 282–292 and accompanying text. 
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relatively short period of delay between scientific change and its legal adop-
tion. 
1. Admissibility 
Both standards for the admission of expert evidence—the Frye stand-
ard264 and the Daubert criteria that replaced it in most jurisdictions265—allow 
for admission of relatively new scientific findings. 
a. Frye Allowed for Admission of New Scientific Findings 
Until 1993, the threshold for the admission of scientific testimony in all 
federal and many state cases was that it “[had] gained general acceptance in 
the particular field in which it belongs.”266 That formulation, known as the 
Frye standard for the case in which it first appeared, may seem to suggest that 
only consensus propositions were admitted to establish causation, but courts 
have not interpreted it that way.267 Instead, many courts emphasized that new 
or controversial opinions were admissible as long as they were derived from 
established scientific principles and methodologies.268 
In the context of toxic torts, the Frye standard meant that as long as the 
methodology used to establish causation was generally accepted, the fact of 
causation needed not be.269 In other words, “products liability law [did] not 
preclude recovery until a statistically significant number of people have been 
injured or until science has had the time and resources to complete sophisticat-
ed laboratory studies of the chemical.”270 Under this standard, preliminary tox-
icological evidence in a toxic tort case would be admitted, because the scien-
tific community generally accepts methodologies used by toxicologists.271 
                                                                                                                                       
264 See infra notes 266–272 and accompanying text. 
265 See infra notes 273–281 and accompanying text. 
266 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also United States v. Kilgus, 
571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (“A necessary predicate to the admission of scientific evidence is 
that the principle upon which it is based ‘must be sufficiently established to have general acceptance 
in the field to which it belongs.’” (quoting Frye, 571 F.2d at 510)). 
267 See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Ac-
ceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 396–400 (2001). 
268 Id. 
269 See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535–36 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that ex-
pert testimony must be based on generally accepted scientific methodologies, but not generally ac-
cepted conclusions). 
270 Id. at 1536 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
271 See id. The admissibility also, somewhat counterintuitively, depends on the extent to which 
the topic has been studied. See Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464, 1469–70 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
Applying the Frye standard in 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that toxico-
logical evidence was not admissible to prove the toxicity of Bendectin because of the presence of 
contrary epidemiological evidence. Id. But the court also held that similar toxicological evidence 
suggesting the toxicity of Depo-Provera was admissible because so little was known about the toxicity 
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Even if the conclusions—the causal links from the product to the illness—are 
not generally accepted, that would not preclude admissibility.272 
b. Daubert Continues to Allow New Scientific Evidence 
In the 1993 case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme 
Court overruled Frye with respect to federal cases, replacing its “general ac-
ceptance” requirement with a standard even more friendly to novel theories of 
causation.273 Daubert was an appeal of a Bendectin case in which the district 
court excluded all toxicological evidence of causation.274 The Supreme Court 
reversed, not because it believed the toxicological evidence should have been 
admitted, but because it held that “general acceptance” was no longer a neces-
sary condition for the admission of scientific evidence.275 Rather, the Court 
instructed district courts to determine for themselves “whether the reasoning or 
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.”276 The Court did 
not formally constrain this inquiry, but it did suggest that a methodology’s test-
ability, its rate of error, whether it has been subject to peer review, and whether 
it has gained “general acceptance” in the scientific community were all rele-
vant to the inquiry into validity.277 
By reducing “general acceptance” to one among several nonexclusive 
factors tending to indicate reliability, Daubert opened the courthouse door to 
novel scientific theories that could prove their validity through means other 
than scientific consensus. For example, when the Court decided Daubert, DNA 
profiling studies were published in peer-reviewed journals, and had known 
error rates, but scientists disagreed about the statistical techniques for calculat-
ing the likelihood of a random match, which was essential to its use in identifi-
cation.278 Meeting the three Daubert criteria other than “general acceptance” 
allowed DNA evidence to be admitted under Daubert where it was at least the-
oretically excludable under Frye.279 In other words, Daubert “does not require 
a consensus to form in the field” before admissibility, which can shorten the 
                                                                                                                                       
of the drug. Id. This holding reflects the general notion that for toxic tort admissibility, uncertainty 
should be resolved in favor of admissibility. For a critique of that position, see David Bernstein, The 
Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 59 (2013). 
272 See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535–36. 
273 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (holding the Frye stand-
ard to be superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
274 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (explaining that 
if epidemiological evidence is available, toxicological evidence is not a generally accepted method of 
establishing causation), vacated, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
275 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597–98. 
276 Id. at 592–93. 
277 Id. at 594. 
278 David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific 
Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 913 (2013). 
279 See id.; see also Redmayne, supra note 247, at 1077 (calling Frye a “wait and see” standard). 
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delay between a new discovery and its legal recognition.280 As Judge Jack. B. 
Weinstein of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York cau-
tioned in a breast implant multidistrict litigation case, “We should not rush to 
judgment where new scientific theories are proposed that lack adequate sup-
port or refutation because they are so new.”281 
2. Sufficiency 
Once a district court has determined the admissibility of causation evi-
dence, it often must also decide whether that evidence is sufficient to support a 
verdict.282 This occurs first at the summary judgment stage, when the judge 
decides whether the plaintiff’s expert evidence establishing causation is suffi-
cient to raise a dispute as to any material fact.283 The court again considers the 
sufficiency of causation evidence if a defendant moves for judgment as a mat-
ter of law (JMOL) during trial, and once again if the defendant renews its 
JMOL motion after losing at trial.284 The court grants a JMOL motion if no 
reasonable jury would find a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support cau-
sation.285 
In measuring the sufficiency of causation evidence, courts use standards 
that are relatively friendly to novel scientific theories. Causation is a question 
of fact that judges “have no special competence to resolve.”286 Courts therefore 
often take the position that once they have admitted evidence on either side of 
a scientific question, they must leave the final determination to the jury.287 As 
the D.C. Circuit explained in a 1984 tort case, on questions that “stand at the 
frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing 
to testify that such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit 
such testimony.”288 
                                                                                                                                       
280 Faigman, supra note 278, at 913. This is not to say that legal acceptance of a novel scientific 
theory is ever instantaneous, even under Daubert. For example, one of the standard’s most important 
measures—whether the scientific idea has been subject to peer review—acts as a delay mechanism, as 
the process of review and publication can take up to several years. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
281 In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Judge Weinstein then 
quoted a passage from Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, implying that “radical new 
theories” may have a place in toxic tort trials. See id. (quoting THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF 
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52 (2d ed. 1970)); see also Feldman, supra note 252, at 9 (“By allowing 
trial judges to consider testability, peer review, and publication in addition to general acceptance, 
however, Daubert makes room for testimony based on innovative research developed with techniques 
not yet generally accepted so long as they are genuinely empirical methods or have received some 
scrutiny from other scientists.”). 
282 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 56. 
283 See id. 56. 
284 See id. 50. 
285 See id. 
286 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1534. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
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Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, a 1986 Bendectin case, illus-
trates how the sufficiency rules allow new and controversial theories to support 
recovery.289 When the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in Ox-
endine, the court granted Merrell’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.290 The trial court concluded that although the expert evidence support-
ing causation was admissible, it was legally insufficient because the plaintiffs’ 
expert witness himself “admitted in his testimony that each of the studies on 
which he relied could not, by itself, support a finding of causation.”291 The 
D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury was entitled to combine 
the studies “to produce a whole that was greater than the sum of its parts.”292 
The court’s opinion thus made clear that equivocal, tentative studies can sup-
port an inference of causation. 
C. The Costs of Delay: Toxic Tort Suits and  
Antitrust Rulemaking Compared 
The doctrinal explanation for trial courts’ reactivity to changes in causa-
tion evidence begs the normative question: Is the tort system’s sensitivity to 
scientific change a good thing? Answering that question requires identifying 
the correct balance between the informational benefits of delay and its costs in 
the toxic tort context, a project beyond the scope of this Article.293 But it seems 
clear that although delay can provide informational benefits in both the anti-
trust rulemaking and toxic tort litigation contexts, its costs in the tort context 
are much higher. 
Tort law’s two primary goals, compensating the injured and deterring un-
safe conduct, demand accuracy in fact finding and speed and finality in resolv-
ing disputes.294 Accuracy in antitrust rulemaking, although likewise important 
to the Supreme Court, is defined in a way that makes delay less costly in that 
context. Furthermore, speed and finality play a much smaller role in antitrust 
rulemaking than toxic tort litigation. Without claiming that tort law strikes the 
                                                                                                                                       
289 Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc, 506 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C. 1986). 
290 Id. at 1102. The Oxendine case was decided before a “motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict” was renamed a “renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 
50. 
291 Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1110. 
292 Id. 
293 At least one scholar has addressed this question head-on, and answered it in the negative. See 
Cheng, supra note 257, at 321. 
294 See Feldman, supra note 252, at 34 & nn.168–69. I have omitted a third aim of tort law that 
Feldman identifies, that “it tries to expressively yoke victims of overly risky activity with their injur-
ers by requiring injurers to compensate those they have harmed[,]” because it is a more controversial 
goal, and perhaps a more peripheral one, than compensation and deterrence. See id. In any case, be-
cause accuracy and speed are still important to linking victims with their injurers, including such a 
goal (and others, including corrective justice) would not affect my analysis. 
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optimal balance, I argue that these differences suggest that optimal delay is 
shorter in tort litigation than in antitrust rulemaking. 
1. Accuracy, Speed, and Finality in Tort Litigation 
Tort law’s goals of deterrence and compensation demand that individual 
factual determinations in tort cases be as accurate as possible.295 Inaccurate 
decisions undermine tort law’s goal of compensating the injured, because they 
either undercompensate plaintiffs who actually suffered at the hands of a de-
fendant or provide windfalls to plaintiffs with injuries caused by bad luck or a 
third party. Likewise, inaccurate causation findings undermine tort’s deterrence 
goals; if potential defendants have no confidence that causation will be reliably 
discovered at trial, they have less incentive to discover the truth about their 
products and take the appropriate precautions in marketing them. Inaccurate 
judgments also have significant collateral consequences—bankrupting compa-
nies and making safe and effective products unavailable to those who need 
them.296 
Speed and finality also serve tort law’s two main goals of compensation 
and deterrence. Delay between injury and recovery represents an uncompen-
sated period for plaintiffs, and compensation that is not final is undercompen-
satory to injured plaintiffs. On the other side of the same coin, speed and finali-
ty aid in tort’s deterrence goal by raising the stakes for defendants considering 
risky behavior. Speed and finality also have the collateral benefit of minimiz-
ing judicial costs. 
But in the toxic tort context, where scientific evidence of causation is of-
ten uncertain at first, the goal of accuracy in fact-finding on the one hand and 
the goals of speed and finality on the other work at cross-purposes. Toxicolog-
ical evidence of causation—relatively cheap and easy to obtain—typically pre-
cedes extensive epidemiological study of the effects of a product. This means 
that for toxic causation, the bad evidence tends to precede the good.297 Typical-
ly, medical evidence about the effects of a product has not achieved maturity at 
the time of suit,298 but once a suit is filed, justice (and its goals of compensa-
tion and deterrence) dictates a speedy and final resolution to the legal contro-
versy.299 This suggests that the kind of delay in the face of scientific uncertain-
ty that characterizes Supreme Court rulemaking may be too costly in terms of 
individual justice in tort cases. 
                                                                                                                                       
295 See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 181–84 (2010). 
296 See Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1, 22–23 (1993) (discussing the collateral harm of the Bendectin litigation). 
297 See Cheng, supra note 257, at 328. 
298 Feldman, supra note 252, at 17. 
299 See Cheng, supra note 257, at 329–40 (discussing the importance of speed and finality to 
tort’s goals). 
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Delay is also less attractive in the tort context because its costs are dis-
proportionately borne by plaintiffs. Rejecting less-than-certain theories of 
harm in order to wait for confirmation from the scientific community would 
mean dismissing meritorious as well as factually unfounded claims. Thus, de-
lay would systematically disadvantage plaintiffs while providing defendants a 
period of legal immunity lasting as long as there is scientific uncertainty about 
their products. In addition to creating bad incentives for manufacturer-led re-
search, this grace period works against tort’s goals of swift compensation and 
strong deterrence.300 
2. Accuracy, Speed, and Finality in Antitrust Rulemaking 
In contrast, when the Supreme Court makes antitrust rules, it cares less 
about accuracy in an individual case than it does about adopting the economi-
cally accurate rule in the long term.301 In part, this is because in antitrust the 
Court acts as regulator, not adjudicator.302 Thus, the costs to certainty and sta-
bility of changing a legal opinion about scientific information is higher for the 
Court in antitrust than for lower courts addressing toxic causation. Taking a 
best guess on a new scientific issue in Supreme Court rulemaking carries with 
it a significant risk of later having to undo that guess when the passage of time 
has revealed better information.303 The costs of that flip-flop are visited on all 
                                                                                                                                       
300 The costs of an overly conservative approach to new scientific theories about tort causation 
can also be expressed in terms of Type I/II errors. See J. Neyman & E.S. Pearson, The Testing of Sta-
tistical Hypotheses in Relation to Probabilities A Priori, 29 MATHEMATICAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CAMBRIDGE PHIL. SOC. 492, 493 (1933) (originating terms Type I and Type II errors). If a Type I 
error is defined as crediting science later rejected by a scientific consensus, and Type II error is reject-
ing science later proved to be reliable, then tort law is relatively neutral (at least compared to the anti-
trust context) about which kind of error is more costly. See id. Type I errors, as the Bendectin and 
breast implant examples show, can be very costly. But so, too, are Type II errors because they not 
only prevent compensation and undermine deterrence, but they also perpetuate a dangerous product on 
the market. 
301 See PERRY, supra note 5, at 220. 
302 See Haw, supra note 130, at 1255–59. This is consonant with the Court’s general perspective 
that its primary function is to make or clarify law, not to resolve individual disputes. See PERRY, supra 
note 5, at 220. 
303 Following the Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision, at least one 
scholar expressed concern that tying legal rules to social science meant risking rapid reversals. Ed-
mond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U L. REV. 150, 167 (1955); see 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954). The 
fears expressed below may be particular to “fundamental rights,” among which antitrust law has never 
been counted, and the observation that social science is “young” seems less appropriate today, but the 
criticism of Brown’s reliance on relatively new and contested social science nicely expresses the risks 
of tying law too closely to social scientific findings: 
[S]ince the behavioral sciences are so very young, imprecise, and changeful, their find-
ings have an uncertain expectancy of life. Today’s sanguine asseveration may be can-
celled by tomorrow’s new revelation—or new technical fad. It is one thing to use the 
current scientific findings . . . [to evaluate economic legislation]. It would be quite an-
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market actors within the Court’s jurisdiction. In contrast, trial courts in tort 
cases primarily concern themselves with doing justice in the individual case 
where courts face significant pressure to act swiftly to compensate victims and 
deter risky behavior. 
But delay is more costly in tort trials than in antitrust rulemaking for rea-
sons other than the Court’s institutional status. Delay, like other conservative 
devices, creates a status quo default, which has a distorting effect in the tort 
context, where the length of time a plaintiff must wait to recover on a scientific 
theory is inversely related to the amount of care a manufacturer will take with 
the safety of its products. In antitrust, delay has no such systematically biased 
result because antitrust plaintiffs and defendants can both advance new, con-
troversial science supporting a rule change.304 Moreover, economically inaccu-
rate rules tend to harm all market actors; they tend to diminish the pie but do 
not necessarily influence how it is sliced. 
Finally, the contexts differ in terms of notice to parties. An existing anti-
trust rule, however inefficient, is presumably known to both parties at the time 
of their conduct. A party advancing a new economic theory as support for legal 
change assumes the risk of disappointment when it engages in the conduct 
prohibited by an inefficient rule. But the victim of a new product with little 
information about its safety never had a similar opportunity to avoid the dis-
pute in the first place. Delaying the victim’s recovery in the hopes that better 
science will emerge thus punishes an innocent actor. 
CONCLUSION 
Law is often aimed at a moving target, whether it be evolving standards 
of decency, privacy in an age of technology, or academic notions of economic 
efficiency. Optimally adapting law to changed circumstances requires not only 
a reliable understanding of those circumstances but also a sensitivity to the 
costs that attend frequent legal change. Delay can both improve the infor-
mation used to significantly alter doctrine while also preventing rapid and dis-
ruptive reversals in doctrine. By observing that delay can improve the Court’s 
informational inputs, I do not mean to argue that the Court necessarily deliber-
ately uses it to achieve this effect. Nor do I claim that the delay observed in its 
antitrust jurisprudence is optimal; there is a strong argument that the interval 
                                                                                                                                       
other thing to have our fundamental rights rise, fall, or change along with the latest 
fashions of psychological literature. 
See Cahn, supra. 
304 Compare, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 884–87 (noting how the defendant was the party arguing 
for a reversal of Dr. Miles in light of academic consensus that the per se rule was wrong), with Con-
cord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting how the plain-
tiffs were the party advocating for a new antitrust rule on market share discounts). 
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between Telser’s article and Leegin was too long. But I do mean to suggest that 
delay, as an information-maximizing—yet conservatizing—device, may have a 
salutary effect on lay decision making in the face of scientific change. 
The problems that attend a lay Court interpreting scientific information 
are large and growing. Science plays an essential role in almost all areas of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence; indeed in some areas, as in antitrust, it may be 
the most important decisional input of all. Any device that improves the ration-
ality of judicial decision making in these areas of law should be recognized, 
theorized, and balanced against its costs. Delay, as such a device, offers signif-
icant benefits to judges struggling to bridge the gap between what they know 
and what they must decide. 
  
 
